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For here we are not afraid to follow truth wherever it may lead, nor
to tolerate any error so long as reason is left free to combat it.
[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ....
[E]rroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and . .. must be protected ....
The basis of the contention for a more liberal indulgence lies in the
modern conditions which govern the collection of news items and the
insistent popular expectation that newspapers will expose, and the
popular demand that they shall expose, actual and suspected fraud, graft,
greed, malfeasance, and corruption in public affairs and questionable
conduct on the part of public men and candidates for office without
stint, leaving to the people themselves the final verdict as to whether
[factual] charges made or opinions expressed were justified.3
Criticism of so much of another's activities as are matters of public
concern is privileged if the criticism, although defamatory, (a) is upon,
(i) a true or privileged statement of fact, or (ii) upon facts otherwise
4
known or available to the recipient as a member of the public ....

1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Roscoe (Dec. 27, 1820), in 15 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302, 303 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., Monticello ed. 1904).
2. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964).
3. Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 286 (Kan. 1908).
4.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 606(1) (1938).
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But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
We are not persuaded that,

. .

. an additional separate constitutional

privilege for "opinion" is required to ensure the freedom of expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment. The dispositive question in the
present case then becomes whether a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the statements in [defendant's] column imply an assertion
that [the plaintiff] perjured himself in a judicial proceeding . . .. This is
not the sort of loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language which would
negate the impression that the writer was seriously maintaining that [the
plaintiff] committed the crime of perjury.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Exactly twenty years ago, the Supreme Court handed down a decision whose
narrow question belied its broader effect on the First Amendment. In Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co., Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held
that defendants to defamation actions would no longer be protected by a finding
that their statement was "opinion" as opposed to "fact." 9 Given the linguistic
difficulty of dichotomizing statements that way, the Court declined to exonerate
otherwise defamatory utterances just because the speaker might place the words
"I think" or "in my opinion" before such contentious words as "Jones is a liar,"
"Smith is a thief," etc. 10 The few commentators on the case, both at the time and
on other anniversaries of Milkovich since then, agreed that the narrow holding
made good sense, not only as a matter of language, but also of common law
precedent and of First Amendment doctrine." Although New York's state court
went on to afford protection to opinions under its own constitution,12 Some

5.
6.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990).

7.

See Milkovich, 497 U.S. 1.

8.

Id.

9.
Id. at 19.
10. See id.
11. After a flurry of immediate scholarly attention, which this Article cites piecemeal
throughout, there have been several retrospectives. See, e.g., Kathryn Dix Sowle, A Matter of
Opinion: Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 467, 478-98 (1994) (discussing

the facts of Milkovich and the Court's opinion); M. Eric Eversole, Note, Eight Years After
Milkovich: Applying a ConstitutionalPrivilege for Opinions Under the Wrong Constitution, 31

IND. L. REv. 1107, 1116-28 (1998) (examining the holding of Milkovich and its treatment in lower
courts).
12. See Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1277-82 (N.Y. 1991), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991). See generally Nancy K. Bowman, Milkovich Meets Modern
Federalismin Libel Law: The Lost Opinion Privilege Gives Birth to Enhanced State Constitutional
Protection, 42 DEPAuL L. REv. 583, 615 (1992) ("[T]he Immuno state law method can insulate its
opinion analysis from federal review and provide a safe harbor for media defendants."). For a more

recent appraisal of New York's greater constitutional protection for opinion, see Justice Schlesinger,
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commentators saw Milkovich's clarification of some confusion in the lower
federal courts on this issue as salutary. 13
This Article springboards from an acceptance of the dissolution of the
fact/opinion dichotomy to a far broader inquiry about the implications of
Milkovich for key First Amendment principles. I contend that the decision
precisely reverses the constitutional logic of breaking down the distinction
between fact and opinion-instead of worrying that opinions might hide factual
falsehoods as the Court does in Milkovich, the First Amendment confidently
expects informed listeners to interpret even false factual statements as nothing
more than the opinion of the speaker. I argue that the 1990 reasoning thus
utterly deflates the aspirations of one of its purported precedents, New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,14 and expands a trend already present in some postSullivan cases-to strip the Warren Court's masterpiece bare of all but its wellknown "actual malice" holding,15 namely that a public official suing for

defamation must prove that the speaker knew the statement was false or uttered
it with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. 16 Especially at risk under Justice
Rehnquist's reasoning in Milkovich is the First Amendment's faith in the
audience, in listeners' ability to decide for themselves, without judicial guidance
or protection, both the meaning and the import of a statement, particularly a
statement about matters of public concern. I argue that the twenty-year-old
precedent joins with other cases before and since to create the image of a passive
audience, capable of gathering, but not assessing, new information and needful
of the paternalistic hand of judges to avoid the pitfalls of ordinary human
communication. We are still suffering in 2010 from Milkovich's pessimistic
bypath.17
Lost to us today, I argue, is the notion of the interpreting audience that
pervades the pages of Sullivan.!8 With its roots in excellent common law

sources cited by the Warren Court,19 this focus on the audience needs to be
revived in every generation. The First Amendment, in this view, encourages
audiences as much as speakers. For this Internet age, where the acquisition of
raw data has become a universal hobby but the assumption is often that

Statements in NewspaperArticles Deemed ProtectedOpinion When Viewed in 'Context,'N.Y. L.J.,

May 13, 2005, at 19 (providing a summary of a New York defamation case).
13. See, e.g., Catherine Calhoun, Case Comment, First Amendment Does Not Provide
Absolute Protectionfor Statements of Opinion in Libel Actions: Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 25
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 221, 227 (1991) ("By stating that Gertz did not create an absolute privilege for

opinions, the Court [in Milkovich] corrects the lower courts' mistaken reliance on its dicta.").
14. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
15. See infra Part Ill.
16. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (discussing the standard for actual malice).
17. See infra Part VIII.

18. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 ("[I]t is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination." (quoting Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring))).
19. See id. at 280 n.20 (citing a number of state court decisions adopting variations of the

"actual malice" standard).
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audiences are incapable of digesting the data in any but the most simplistic ways,
this Article also seeks to reinvigorate the citizen-interpreter-one who can parry,
through thought and action, both the sheer mass of data and the piling on of huge
amounts of corporate dollars. 20
In setting Milkovich as dramatically opposed both to Sullivan and the
common law, this Article reconstructs a citizenry that zestfully learns about and
reflects upon matters of public importance and then reverses the flow of
discourse that it considers false or otherwise ill-advised. I endeavor to recapture
Sullivan's insistence-now long since abandoned-that factual falsehoods play a
special and constitutionally protected role in moving audiences to assess and
improve the informational flow on matters of public concern.21 This Article, in
so doing, endeavors to answer such influential critics of Sullivan as Robert Post22
and Richard Epstein. 23 In different ways, these critics-who do not spill much
ink on Milkovich's dubious doctrine24 -have lost sight of the acquisitive
interpreter and her self-protecting citizen role.

20.

For a brief discussion of the recently decided Citizens United v. Federal Election

Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), see infra Part VIII. I cast a vote for the outcome on the basis of
this entire Article's reasoning, and therefore my endorsement of the extension to corporate dollars
of free political speech has nothing to do with the corporate speaker's rights and everything to do
with the First Amendment aspiration that audiences can field and interpret for themselves all public
discourse. Nonetheless, critics of the new case may well fear the audience's ability in 2010 to
weigh, as opposed to receive, information. "Over the past year, Americans have spent an average of
11.8 hours a day consuming information, sucking up, in aggregate, 3.6 zettabytes of data and 10,845
trillion words." William Falk, Op-Ed, Should Old Articles Be Forgot,N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 29, 2009,
at A3 1. A far more conservative monthly estimate is Nielsen//NetRatings's 13.73 hours of Internet
usage. Press Release, Nielsen//NetRatings, U.S. Internet Usage Shows Mature Growth, Forcing
Innovation of New Web Offerings, According to Nielsen//NetRatings 1 (Mar. 18, 2005),
http://www.nielsen-online.com/pr/pr 050318.pdf. But data acquisition for its own sake does not
guarantee careful political balancing as is indicated by the increasing trend to choose sites already
aligned with the citizen's preconceived interpretations. See, e.g., John Harwood, IfFox Is Partisan,
It Is Not Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2009, at A12. For an interesting take on the downside of mere
data, see GEOFFREY HARTMAN, SCARS OF THE SPIRIT 85-99 (2002). Data acquisition is in the

service of "simple themes" as opposed to interpretive thought. See Richard W. Stevenson, The
Muddled Selling of the President,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010 at WKl.

21. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271 ("[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,
and ... it must be protected .... ).
22. See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, DemocraticDeliberation,and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 603, 612
& n.47 (1990) [hereinafter Post, Constitutional Concept]; Robert C. Post, Defaming Public
Officials: On Doctrine and Legal History, 1987 AM. B. FouND. RES. J. 539, 556 [hereinafter Post,
Review Essay] (book review).

23. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
782, 817-18 (1986) [hereinafter Epstein, Was Times Wrong?].
24. Professor Post does highlight the rhetorical slipperiness of the Milkovich majority: "Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion is rhetorically adept ....
But the argumentative structure of the
opinion is obscure, making it difficult to discern a crisp course of reasoning." See Post,
Constitutional Concept, supra note 22 at 612. I return to this key aspect of the Chief Justice's
performance in Part II, having written about his rhetorical legerdemain in a different constitutional
context. See Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on Adjudication in Billy Budd,
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This Article proceeds by reverse chronology through three paradigmatic
First Amendment cases, beginning with a thorough discussion of Milkovich.
Next, Milkovich's most influential precedent, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,2 5 is
shown to have departed from the basic First Amendment spirit of Sullivan, so
that the move made twenty years ago becomes almost inevitable once we
understand that the seminal Warren Court aspirations had already been
abandoned. Then, this Article contrasts Sullivan and its explicitly emphasized
common law roots in the privilege of fair comment on matters of public concern
with the approach in the later cases. Here, this Article foregrounds the common
law so vital to the 1964 decision in three varieties: English cases providing a
privilege to libel where audiences are assumed to have a sufficient interpretive
capacity; the Restatement (First)of Torts and Restatement (Second) of Torts in

the United States; and American state court "majority rule" decisions, which for
awhile departed from the Restatements' interpreting audience model but then
were corrected by Sullivan's formal elevation of the "minority" approach within
the states regarding the privilege. Remarkably, mainstream First Amendment
analysis has utterly lost this formal co-holding of the 1964 decision almost from
the start,26 and Milkovich compounds the confusion. The Article then
contextualizes the highly relevant Sullivan-progeny cases on hyperbole and
exaggerated speech, and it concludes by expanding on its central notion of the
interpreting audience-the conjuration for the year 2010 of an aggressive,
publicly oriented listener and speaker who is not distracted by gossip, satire, or
the onslaught of raw data for its own sake, but rather seeks to understand and
contextualize information with the aim of becoming a more knowledgeable and
active citizen.
II. MILKOVICHREHEARSED

A dispute that preoccupied the Cleveland suburbs of Mentor and Maple
Heights, Ohio, for many months originated when two high school wrestling
teams started to brawl during a scheduled match.27 Differences of opinion
quickly ensued as to whether the Maple Heights High School's coach,
Milkovich, had goaded his team to fight the other wrestlers or, in his version,

Sailor with an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 42-58 (1982). My article was
cited on the floor of the Senate by then Senator Joseph Biden in an attempt to block Rehnquist's
ascent to Chief Justice. 132 CONG. REc. 23,759 1986 (statement of Senator Biden).

25. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
26. See infra Part IV. However, for an early and brilliant exception, see Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "the CentralMeaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup.
CT. REV. 191, 193-94.
27. See David Margolick, How a '74 FracasLed to a High Court Libel Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 1990, at B8 (discussing the aftermath of the melee on the communities including "a series
of house-to-house bottle drives and spaghetti dinners" to raise money to appeal Maple's
suspension).
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had ordered them to return to the bench and cease the extracurricular hostilities. 28
One of Coach Milkovich's critics was J. Theodore Diadiun, a reporter for The
News-Herald of Willoughby, Ohio.2 9 After the coach formally testified at a
School Board hearing into the fracas, Diadiun wrote a column in which he
opined that Milkovich had lied to the Board about his role in the incident. 30
Among Diadiun's allegedly defamatory statements, which also implicated Maple
Heights's Superintendent of Schools, H. Donald Scott, were the following:
I was among the 2,000-plus witnesses of the meet at which the
trouble broke out, and I also attended the hearing ... so I was in a
unique position of being the only non-involved party to observe both the
meet itself and the Milkovich-Scott version presented to the board.
Any resemblance between the two occurrances [sic] is purely
coincidental.
Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights,
Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and
Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell
the truth. 31
The lawsuit bounced back and forth for more than a decade from a variety of
Ohio court First Amendment decisions to two separate denials of certiorari by
the United States Supreme Court.32 Finally, the Ohio courts having dismissed

28. See id. ("Contrary to the coach's account, the columnist asserted, Mr. Milkovich had
baited officials, egged on the excited crowd and finally stood by when the fight erupted.").
29. See id.
30. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1989).
31. Id. at 6-7 n.2 (alteration in original) (internal quotations marks omitted).
32. Diadiun's article led to two subsequent libel actions-one involving Coach Milkovich
and another involving Superintendent Scott. For Milkovich's action, the trial court initially entered
a directed verdict, holding that Milkovich failed to satisfy the Sullivan "actual malice" test. See
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 416 N.E.2d 662, 665-66 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979). The Ohio Court
of Appeals held, however, that the trial court should have allowed the jury to consider whether the
defendants' "acted upon a reliable source"; thus, it reversed and remanded. Id. at 667, cert. denied,
449 U.S. 966 (1980). On remand, the trial court entered summary judgment for the newspaper,
finding that the article was an expression of opinion; the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed.
Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (Ohio 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985).
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded, however, finding Diadiun's statements to be
"factual" in nature. Id. at 1196-97. Shortly thereafter, in Superintendent Scott's libel action, the
Supreme Court of Ohio once again determined whether Diadiun's statements were "factual." Scott
v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 701 (Ohio 1986). This time, the court held that they were
"opinion." Id. Thus, when the Ohio Court of Appeals decided Milkovich on remand, it relied on the
precedent created by Superintendent Scott's action and held that the statements were "opinion."
Milkovich v. News-Herald, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), cert. granted,493 U.S.
1055 (1990). It was this holding that led to the famous Supreme Court appeal twenty years ago.
See id. For a succinct history of the events leading to the Supreme Court's Milkovich opinion, see
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the complaint because the column was constitutionally protected "opinion," the
Supreme Court reversed.3 3 The majority decision by Chief Justice Rehnquist
essentially found that facts are difficult to separate from opinions, 34 that
audiences need to be wary when the latter hide factual falsehoods, 35 and that
there was never meant to be a blanket First Amendment protection of
,36
6
opinions.
Key to understanding the speech act Milkovich claimed to be libelous is its
context-virtually everyone in the community who saw Diadiun's column
already knew about the event. 3 7 It was a classic common law 38 and First
Amendment "matter[] of public concern." 39 Regarding libel cases brought

Daniel Anker, Case Comment, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.: The Balance Tips, 41 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 613, 614-16 (1991).

33. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 23.
34. See id. at 18-19.
35.

See id. at 19.

36. See id The dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan, joined only by Justice Marshall, has
been found wanting by at least one commentator because it essentially "agrees with the majority
opinion in rejecting [an exemption for opinions]" and disagrees only with the majority's finding that
Diadiun had implied a false factual basis for his conclusion about Milkovich. Anker, supra note 32
at 625 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 26-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). On the terms of this Article,
the dissent basically joins forces with the majority's idea that the audience always needs judicial
help to fetter out any factual falsehood. See infra Part JV.B. Still, the dissent quite significantly
stresses the audience in finding that "[n]o reasonable reader could understand Diadiun to be
impliedly asserting-as fact-that Milkovich had perjured himself." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 30
(Brennan, J., dissenting). As I shall discuss, this dissenting language comports with the "hyperbole"
cases, such as Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), and

attempts-albeit weakly-to redeem the "interpreting audience" concept I stress throughout this
Article.
37. See Margolick, supra note 27, at B8.
38. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 566 cmt.a (1938) ("[D]efamation may consist of
a comment upon some act or omission of another which is accurately stated by the person making
the comment or which, because of its notoriety or otherwise, is known to the recipient. If such
comment expresses a sufficiently derogatory opinion as to the conduct in question, it is defamatory
and, unless it is privileged as fair comment, is actionable." (citation omitted)). According to the
Restatement (First)of Torts, "Criticism of so much of another's activities as are matters of public
concern is privileged if the criticism, although defamatory, (a) is upon, (i) a true or privileged
statement of fact, or (ii) upon facts otherwise known or available to the recipient as a member of the
public...." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 606(1) (1938) (emphasis added). Sullivan

elevated (a)(ii) above (a)(i) through its use of Coleman v. MacLennan. See N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-282 (1964) (citing and quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281,
281-82, 285-86 (1908)). The key phrase "available to the recipient as a member of the public,"
adequately encapsulates the long tradition of what I call here the "interpreting audience." See infra
Part IV.B.3. For further discussion of this proposition, see W. BLAKE ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE
LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 192-93 (4th ed. 1905). The Restatement (Second) of Torts is fully in

accord, categorizing the fair comment privilege and statements made on fully revealed facts as
"opinion." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt.a (1977).
39. See Rosebloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 46 (1971); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270-71.
Despite a misstep in Gertz to which I will return, more recent cases have made clear that statements
on matters of public concern always get greater First Amendment protection. See Phila.
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (requiring a private figure plaintiff to prove
falsity if suing upon a matter of public concern); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
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against utterances in this context, the law had for a century and a half granted
significant latitude to defendants whose remarks-otherwise false and tending to
lower the plaintiffs reputation-concerned issues already accessible and of
great interest to the intended audience of the remark. 40 The idea, ensconced in
England and America long prior to the constitutionalizing of the tort of libel,41
seems to be subtly nuanced from the obvious goal of encouraging the speaker to
debate key issues;42 as important as that liberalization of libel law had been, I
argue that the goal was even greater of encouraging the audience to be actively
acquisitive of knowledge where public issues were involved. No single remark
added to the verbal turmoil could so manipulate the knowledgeable audience as
to divert it from its own consistent search for the truth. On the contrary, factual
falsehoods, by provoking informed citizens, goad them to reexamine the issue
and to move the discourse correctly forward.
Seen this way, Diadiun's column and its allegation that Milkovich was a
"liar" would be relatively insignificant compared to the wealth of information
and comment that was already available to an audience presumptively trusted to
do its own homework about the fracas. Some lower courts had so found,
including in a collateral case in Ohio brought on roughly the same facts by
Maple Heights's school superintendent, Scott. 4 3 Despite the Supreme Court of
Ohio's holding that Milkovich was a private figure, on remand the court of
appeals protected the libelous reporter largely because it recognized that
Diadiun's article qualified as "opinion." 45 The public discourse stakes required a

Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759-61 (1985) (implying that little or nothing of the First Amendment continues
to control in the absence of a public concern utterance where a private figure sues a non-media
defendant).
40. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 606 cmt.a (1938); infra Part IV.
41. See Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 22, at 627 (citing and quoting Tabart v.
Tipper, (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 981 (K.B.) 983-85 n.*; 1 Camp. 349, 354-59 n.*) (discussing the
history of "public discourse" and expanding on an early English case involving book reviews that
defined the privilege). For a far more extensive discussion of that case and others like it, see infra
Part IV.A.2.
42. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ([T]he
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade ideas.").
43. See Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 708-09 (Ohio 1986) (noting that both the
trial court and the court of appeals held that the Diadiun article was constitutionally protected
speech and reasoning that "the allegations that Milkovich or Scott 'lied' . . . would appear to fall
into the area of law where we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters,
particularly where, as in the instant case, the issues involved are of importance to the community
and the vehicle for dissemination of the ideas is opinion" (citation omitted) (quoting Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted))). For the facts of the
Scott case, see id. at 700-701.
44. See Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1195-96 (Ohio 1984) ("[W]e hold that
for the purposes of defamation law and analysis ... [Milkovich] is not a public figure or public
official as a matter of law.").
45. See Milkovich v. News-Hearld, 545 N.E.2d 1320, 1324-25 (1989). The court did not
elaborate on its decision to categorize the article as "constitutionally protected opinion," but rather
relied on the Supreme Court of Ohio's consideration of the piece in Scott. See id. at 1324. In Scott,
the court discussed "the broader context of the allegedly defamatory remarks" and implied that
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defendant-favorable approach given, as they saw it, the state of constitutional
law. 46
The United States Supreme Court reversed.47 It decided to utilize the
dispute to focus on a single troubling subset of the rhetorical context cases
sounding in libel. Were the lower courts correct, Chief Justice Rehnquist asked
in his majority opinion, when they specifically exonerated Diadiun and the
newspaper by finding the column to be "opinion" as opposed to "fact"? 48
Although this narrowing of the categories of context-based libel jurisprudence
under common law and First Amendment precedents was of course legitimate,
and even perhaps necessary to correct some erroneous assumptions about the
pristine nature of opinion statements, the analysis of Diadiun's remarks and the
Court's conclusion that Milkovich could proceed with his case 49 threaten the
fabric of respect for the audience woven into years of common law and First
Amendment jurisprudence.
After taking a shot at the thorny distinction linguistically examined in prior
decades, 50 the Court decided that there was no sufficient First Amendment
reason, when libel cases are brought, to immunize statements that appear to be
opinion as opposed to fact. In so doing, the Court explicitly sought to console
the First Amendment community by citing (although distinguishing) what it saw

informed audiences would be perfectly capable of fielding the column's inaccuracies. See Scott,
496 N.E.2d at 708-09.
46. See Milkovich, 545 N.E.2d at 1324.
47. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990).
48. See id. at 10 ("We granted certiorari to consider the important questions raised by the
Ohio courts' recognition of a constitutionally required "opinion" exception to the application of its
defamation laws." (citation omitted)). For the full list of rhetorical context cases that the Milkovich
majority utilizes, including such leading libel cases as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 367 U.S.
254 (1964), Curtis PublishingCo. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974), see Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 14-21.
49. See id. at 23 (remanding the case "for further proceedings").
50. See id. at 17-23. Given the sophistication of the common law's linguistic struggle with
fact and opinion, Rehnquist's analysis could be accurate but fairly rudimentary: "If a speaker says,
'In my opinion John Jones is a liar,' he implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion
that Jones told an untruth." Id. at 18. On the other hand, given the precedents on matters of public
concern, Rehnquist's analysis could be misleading: "Even if the speaker states the facts upon which
he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is
erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of fact." Id. at 18-19. The common law
rule is best understood as protecting-absent some kind of malice-a factual falsehood, as long as it
is fully articulated or presumptively available to the audience. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 566 (1977) ("A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an
opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed
defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.");

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

§

606 cmt. c

(1938) ("[T]he fact that the comment or criticism is one which is not reasonably warranted by the
facts upon which it is based is immaterial."); Kalven, supra note 26, at 195 n.18 ("It is arguable that
the fair-comment concept has been awkwardly put in the [majority-rule] common-law decisions and
that what is really involved is the degree to which the underlying facts are disclosed when the
opinion is expressed and the inference drawn.").
51. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
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as sufficient precedential protection for speakers under Sullivan and its
52
progeny.
As we shall now see, the Court-correct in settinf straight at least a small
part of a confusing dictum in its 1974 Gertz case -made several highly
questionable analytical moves under the First Amendment. One, it effectively
reversed the reasoning of Sullivan by fearing factual falsehoods masked as
opinions,54 when Sullivan in fact protected most factual falsehoods and
implicitly saw them as statements that knowledgeable audiences would
understand to be just the opinion of the speaker.s Two, it failed to see that its
precedents dealing with "hyperbole" 56 directly related to the issue before it and
did not occupy a discrete, separate "box" apart from the issues in Milkovich;57
hence, it missed (perhaps wilfully) its best opportunity to test the effect upon
audiences of speech in certain overheated or debate-inspiring contexts. Three, it
badly misconstrued the common law of fair comment on matters of public
concern that Sullivan had deliberately invoked to protect the factual falsehoods
in that case. 8 In this, perhaps its most crucial "mistake," Milkovich either

52. See id at 18. Arguing that the Court should protect its speech, the Lorain Journal
Company relied on dictum from Gertz: "[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact." Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court, however,
distinguished Gertz: "[W]e do not think ... Gertz was intended to create a wholesale defamation
exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion."' Id
53. Id. at 17-19. For the confusing dicta in Gertz, see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-340. Also, for
further discussion of the Gertz clarification in Milkovich, see infra Part III.
54. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19.
55. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964).
56. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 285-86 (1974); Greenbelt
Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1969). For further discussion on both of these cases,
see infra Part V.
57. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16-17, 20.
58. See id. at 11-14. Perhaps distracted by the Chief Justice's dexterous rhetoric, even
authoritative readers of this tradition miss or downplay greatly the place falsehoods hold in testing
the audience that the tradition had previously deemed trustworthy. For example, Professor Post in
his article, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse, acknowledges what he calls the

"curious and muddy distinction between fact and opinion," Post, ConstitutionalConcept, supra note
22, at 605, but then accepts without much consistency the idea that "[flalse statements of fact are
particularly valueless," Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 22, at 613 (alteration in original)
(quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Furthermore, Post, in a 1987 essay, relies on the very dichotomy created by Gertz that
Rehinquist undermines in Milkovich by stating, "Not that untrue statements of fact have inherent
First Amendment value . . . ." Post, Review Essay, supra note 22, at 550. But in Sullivan, after

discussing the common law minority rule protecting "honest misstatements of fact," Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 282 n.21, the Court explicitly adopted the rule, id. at 283, and integrated almost all of
Coleman. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280-82 ("In such a case the occasion gives rise to a privilege,
qualified to this extent: any one claiming to be defamed by the communication must show actual
malice or go remediless. This privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters
of public concern, public men, and candidates for office." (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P.
281, 285 (Kan. 1908))). Professor Post, however, also accepts the skepticism explicit in Gertz-but
not extended beyond that case-to the whole idea of courts defining "matters of public concern,"
see Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 22, at 679 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
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overruled Sullivan while always pretending to preserve it or-at best-stripped
its reasoning down to the well-known actual malice rule and that alone. Four, it
furthered a skeptical and patronizing view of the audience's capacity to field
potential libels on its own and without the intervention of courts, thus reversing a
profound and longstanding contribution of common law and First Amendment
thought. Five, it set state courts to the task of reconciling pre-Milkovich cases
with the fear of audiences that the Court expounded in its majority decision.59
III. THE USE AND ABUSE OF GERTZiN MILKOVICH
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., decided exactly a decade after Sullivan, handed
down a comprehensive reassessment of the First Amendment regarding the law
of libel. A whole new mix of Justices started to fiddle with the master case of
ten years before and provided a precedent this Article sees fulfilled in Milkovich:
pay lip service to (and retain the narrow holding of) Sullivan, while essentially
debunking the rest of that precedent. 60 Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist, a
relative newcomer to the Gertz Court of 1974, correct% perceives in his
Milkovich opinion one-but only one-of the Gertz errors.6 In a famous-or
better, infamous-dictum, Gertz threw off the following dubious remarks:

We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges

Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)), and this even though Post approvingly cites
the common law approach originating in the book review cases, id. at 627-29. In Part VI, I will
discuss this paradox briefly. Professor Post gives surprisingly short shrift to the minority rule of
Coleman in The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse, see id. at 627 n.44, and in his later
Review Essay, see Post, Review Essay, supra note 22, at 544 (citing Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P.
281 (Kan. 1908)). For his part, Professor Epstein similarly disparages, through the extreme brevity
of his treatment, the crucial common law source of constitutional doctrine, and this is even more
provocative because he concludes that the common law would largely have sufficed to resolve the
conflict in Sullivan! See Epstein, Was Times Wrong?, supra note 22, at 795-796.
59. See Bowman, supra note 12, at 613 (citing Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d
1270, 1277-80 (N.Y. 1991)) (discussing New York courts' use of their state constitution to protect
opinions left unprotected after Milkovich). For a more recent appraisal of New York's greater
constitutional protection for "opinion," see Justice Schlesinger, supranote 12, at 19.
60. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974) ("Our accommodation of
the competing values at stake in defamation suits by private individuals allows the States to impose
liability on the publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood on a less demanding showing than
that required by New York Times.").
61.

See PETER CHARLES HOEFFER ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT: AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY

373-74 (2007) (noting that Rehnquist joined the court in January of 1972).
62. SeeMilkovich,497U.S.at18-19.
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constitutional value in false statements of fact.63

169

But there is no

Judges across the country inferred the following syllogism from the Gertz
dictum: a defamatory utterance is actionable only if it contains a statement of
fact that is proven false; opinions (Gertz 's "ideas") cannot be proven false;
therefore, opinions-no matter how derogatory-can never be actionable. 64 By
the time the Court decided Milkovich, "every federal circuit and the courts of at
least thirty-six states and the District of Columbia had held that opinion is
constitutionally protected .... ."
The leading case was Olman v. Evans,66 which tried to provide guidelines
so that courts might distinguish opinion statements from factual assertions and
then move to immunize the former. 67 The liberal desire to protect opinions and
castigate facts as though they were separable was (as we have seen) not really
consistent with the common law's urge to protect and occasionally conflate
both;68 a rich mine worked to finer or grosser effect in the Chief Justice's
Milkovich opinion.

Olman scrutinized statements as to their "full context," their "verifiability,"
and their specific language's "common usage or meaning."69 Olman's fourth
additional factor is particularly important, as it endeavors to reestablish in this
new, somewhat artificial, fact-opinion bifurcated world the idea of faith in the
audience: "[The court] consider[s] the broader context or setting in which the
statement appears.

Different types of writing have,

. .

. widely varying social

63. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40 (footnote omitted). Geoffrey Stone, in a fine, recent book
about other aspects of the First Amendment-and without commenting on the concluding sentence
of the dictum cited above-refers to the Court's opening gambit as "perhaps its single most
important sentence on the freedom of speech...." GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE

SPEECH INWARTIME 75 (2004). The Court's second sentence does seem to recapitulate the spirit of
both Sullivan, see Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269-70, and a whole tradition of free speech thought. See
Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address in Washington, D.C. (March 4, 1801), reprinted in
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 13, 15 (U.S. Gov't Printing

Office, Bicentennial ed. 1989) ("[E]very difference of opinion is not a difference of principle.").
But trouble lay directly ahead in the dictum for everything within that very tradition. Without
"passing go," so to speak, the Gertz Court put that tradition in jail.
64. See ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED

PROBLEMS § 4.2.3.1 (3d ed. 2009) ("Court after court employed the Gertz language as a mandate
for a constitutionally based rule providing immunity for all expressions of opinion.").
65. Id.
66. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc).
67. Id. at 1020-26.
68.

Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

§

606 (1938) (stating that criticisms are

protected if they are based upon facts known to the public or if they are the actual opinion of the
critic), with SACK, supra note 64, at § 4.2.3.2 ("The post-Gertz cases left courts with a single though
by no means easy task: deciding what was an assertion of fact, and therefore potentially actionable,
rather than an opinion, which was necessarily protected.").
69. Olman, 750 F.2d at 979.
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conventions which signal to the reader the likelihood of a statement's being
either fact or opinion. o
Other courts after Gertz also emphasized this idea of the audience's ability
to figure out from context how to understand language that might (otherwise)
seem literally factual and defamatory.71 These courts varied slightly, if at all,
from Olman's manner of separating opinion from fact-the Ninth Circuit, in
Underwager v. Channel 9 Australia, covered almost identical ground but added

an unfortunate concluding emphasis that hints at the fact-aversion of the
Supreme Court during that confusing period:
First, we look at the statement in its broad context, which includes the
general tenor of the entire work, the subject of the statements, the
setting, and the format .... Next we turn to the specific context and
content of the statements, analyzing the extent of figurative or
hyperbolic language used and the reasonable expectations of the
audience in that particular situation. Finally, we inquire whether the
statement itself is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved
true or false.72
Underwager's final prong shows the baleful legacy of the Gertz dictum.
For, despite its opening flourish-a trap for the unwary-Gertz on the whole had
not furthered what would ordinarily be understood as Sullivan's "liberal" First
Amendment agenda. 73 Yes, criticism of public officials and-as the case law
had already long held-public figures were protected by Sullivan's "actual
malice" rule.74 But, as opposed to the mechanical rule, the heart and soul of the
great case were falling by the wayside, and the key departure lay in two aspects
of the dubious dictum in Gertz that gave rise to Underwager and its sister cases

70. Id.
71. See Underwager v. Channel 9 Austl., 69 F.3d 361, 366 (9th Cir. 1995); Janklow v.
Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302-03 (8th Cir. 1986).
72. Underwager, 69 F.3d at 366. See also Potomac Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting
Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 1287-88 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Oilman, 750 F.2d at 979-84) (adopting an
analysis similar to Olman).
73. Compare N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[W]e consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic,
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."), with Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("But there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error matierally advances society's
interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public issues." (quoting Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 270)). For examples of decisions grasping to maintain the Sullivan tradition during the
Gertz to Milkovich period, see Blue Ridge Bank v. Veribanc, Inc., 866 F.2d 681, 685 (4th Cir. 1989)
(citing Potomac Valve, 829 F.2d at 1287-88; Olman, 750 F.2d at 970); Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d
300, 303 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1302-03); Janklow, 788 F.2d at 1302 (citing
Ollman, 750 F.2d at 970); Yiamouyiannis v. Thompson, 764 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. App. 1988)
(citing Olman, 750 F.2d at 978-84).
74. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967).
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in the lower federal courts: One, a perceived distinction between fact and opinion
strongly privileging the latter and dubious about the former; and two, the
implication that any statement seemingly containing a factual element (i.e., most
expository human discourse) was to be distrusted and its content closely
scrutinized against any possible falsehood. Many lower courts embraced the
first element here,75 hence finding an audience-sensitive tool to protect
"opinion." In the process, however, they left alive and well the other part of the
Gertz dictum 76: "[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." 77
Yet, Sullivan precisely had held that the challenged ad's factual errors
contributed to the kind of debates needed on issues of public concern:
The question is whether [the advertisement] forfeits that protection by
the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged
defamation of respondent.
Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees
have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of
truth ... and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the
speaker ....
If neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove
the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct, the
combination of the two elements is no less inadequate.
Furthermore (and concurrently), Sullivan had drawn from American
common law cases the rule that factual falsehoods on matters of public concern
were equally as protected as were opinions and comments, or Gertz's "ideas." 79
Thus, there were paradoxical outgrowths of the Oilman era. On one hand,
courts liberally protected-while they still had the toy that Milkovich grabbed
from their judicial hands-any statement that looked like an "opinion"; on the

75. See SACK, supra note 64, § 4.2.3.1 (citing more than thirty-six state court decisions
holding opinion to be constitutionally protected after Gertz).
76. See Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1114 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)); Miss. Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073, 1079
n.10 (5th Cir. 1976) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340).
77. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
78. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-73. For a discussion of the second holding of Sullivan, see
infra Part IV.B.2.
79. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-80.
80. See Potomac Valve & Fitting Co. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280, 1288 (4th Cir.
1987) ("We hold that a verifiable statement, ... nevertheless qualifies as an 'opinion' if it is clear
from any of the three remaining Olman factors, individually or in conjunction, that a reasonable
reader or listener would recognize its weakly substantiated or subjective character-and discount it
accordingly."); Mr. Chow of N.Y. v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1985)
(applying Olman to find that five of the six statements involved in the suit were opinions).
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other hand, they furthered, in that very process, a debilitating distrust of
statements that could not be thought of as other than "factual."
In so doing,
particularly regarding utterances on matters of public concern, courts fell into the
Gertz dictum trap by gradually eliminating Sullivan's protection of factual
falsehoods,82 which were seen not only as benign and inevitable in all zesty
debates, but also useful to knowledgeable audiences within that context. 83 Under
Sullivan, only actual malice, rare and very hard to prove, would curtail the
willingness of courts to tolerate opinion and factual sloppiness where vigorous
debate was mandated; this was the very rule from Coleman v. MacLennan that
was constitutionalized. 8 4
When Milkovich corrected the first Gertz dictum misstep, the Court should
have gone all the way-particularly since it purported to safeguard Sullivan and
certain audience-sensitive progeny-85 and corrected the second indefensible
statement: "[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." 86 But
this is seemingly not what the Chief Justice wanted. Distrustful of the
audience's ability to field most factual falsehoods, the Court lamentably
continued the momentum from Gertz and insisted that all utterances about
matters of public concern henceforth be scrutinized to detect the possibility of
some factual falsehood lurking under the surface of an apparent opinion.
It is time to develop further the strong speech-protective common law
tradition explicitly seized by Sullivan to protect not only opinions, but false
statements of fact as well. This tradition, emphasized quite differently by
prominent commentators like Post and Epstein, stresses actual or presumed
audience foreknowledge as key to libel suit actionability: where the speaker

81. See Potomac Valve, 829 F.2d at 1286 ("Ideas and opinions bear the personal imprint of
the men and women who hold them. It is therefore particularly important to protect their unfettered
expression, and a rule that chills statements of fact may be acceptable where a rule chilling opinions
would not be."); Mr. Chow, 759 F.2d at 229 ("The statement is not metaphorical o[r] hyperbolic; it
clearly is laden with factual content. Moreover, the statement contains allegations that are
seemingly capable of being proved true or false.").
82.

See, e.g., Potomac Valve, 829 F.2d at 1286.

83. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Wayne, 716 P.2d 842, 849 (Wash. 1986) ("Arguments for
actionability disappear when the audience members know the facts underlying an assertion and can
judge the truthfulness of the allegedly defamatory statement themselves.").
84. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (citing Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 285 (Kan.
1908)).
85. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) ("The New York TimesButts-Gertz culpability requirements further ensure that debate on public issues remains
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270)).
86. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); see also Lisa Herskowitz, One
Bad Bit of Dictum Deserves Another: Gertz and Milkovich, 24 CoNN. L. REv. 1159, 1160 (1992)

(rehearsing Rehnquist's fatal incompleteness in eradicating Gertz's dictum).
87. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20.
88. Both commentators will be examined further in Part IV. For an additional work by
Epstein, see Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the FirstAmendment: The Dangers of
FirstAmendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1003 (2000) [hereinafter Epstein, The Dangers
ofFirstAmendment].
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either provides a factual predicate for the libelous utterance, or where the
audience is assumed to have such knowledge or be capable of attaining it
easily-especially regarding matters of public concern-opinions are
protected. The next step taken in Sullivan is to protect even false statements of
fact where, again, the Court presumes the audience is responsible for attaining a
knowledge base adequate to offset the last marginal falsehood thrown at it by a
speaker adding to the cauldron of debate-as say in Milkovich-on matters of
public concern. 90
IV. SULLIVAN'S NEGLECTED SECOND HOLDING AND ITS COMMON LAW FAITH IN
THE INTERPRETING AUDIENCE

A.

The Plaintiff-Friendly Common Law of Defamation and its Exception
RegardingMatters of Common Knowledge
1.

OrdinaryDefamation Suits

The common law of defamation, as significantly reflected, for example, in

the lower courts of Alabama91 whose rulings provoked constitutional scrutiny in
Sullivan, was remarkably helpful to plaintiffs, especially when their suit sounded
in written libel as opposed to spoken slander.92 The burden of proof, at least at
the outset of the case, was satisfied by a showing of a defamatory utterance of
and concerning the plaintiff that was published to at least one person besides the
plaintiff.93 With some exceptions generally sounding in slander cases, there was
no requirement to show fault of any kind, damages of any kind, or even the
falsity of the utterance. 94
The defendant was vouchsafed merely a
"justification," namely a showing that the utterance was substantially true, a
burden imposed on the speaker and not his target.95

89.

See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

§ 606

cmt. b (1938).

90. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72, 279-80 (1964).
91. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 37 Ala. 1962 (citing White v. Birmingham
Post Co., 172 So. 649, 652 (Ala. 1937); Iron Age Pub. Co. v. Crudup, 5 So. 332, 333 (Ala. 1889)).
92. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at
776 (5th ed. 1984).
93. See id. § 111, at 771. On the general subject of this paper, this fifth edition, which of
course could not have foreseen Milkovich, fairly confidently assumed that the "constitutional
privileges are likely to encompass all pure opinions [e.g., those upon a fully stated factual predicate
or regarding the privilege of fair comment], even those that have heretofore been regarded as false
and actionable, that would make the expression of pure opinions non-actionable." Id. § 113A, at
813.
94. Id. § 112, at 795. An exception for many slander (as opposed to libel) cases existed, but
even here courts presumed damages for many merely slanderous utterances. Id. § 112, at 788.
95. See id. § 116, at 840.
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In CertainSubject Areas, a Defendant is Nonetheless Protected

Long before Sullivan, however, British and American judges (or
occasionally legislators) had framed broad exceptions for libel utterances that
aimed at subject matters already known or knowable to their audiences. 96 As to
core political speech-utterances having to do with public officials or
government policies-many authorities listed such comments as nondefamatory, holding that every individual had a right, and not merely a privilege,
to make them.97 Similarly, vituperative literary criticism received strong
protection.9 8
No doubt, of course, vitriol and exaggerated criticism poured upon a
government official or a published book might well have a detrimental effect on
a plaintiffs reputation; just as often (to this day), political commentators or
reviewers of books may harm themselves more than the subject reviewed by
making extreme and negative statements. 99 Those interested in finding
something out for themselves need merely to refer to the data freely available.
After all, a political issue or a book under review is optimally indicative of what
we more generally call a "matter[] of public concern"100 : it is a self-contained
universe of all the information the interpreting audience will ever need. They
will make up their minds not through litigation, but through investigation. The

96. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 606 cmt. b (1938); Alfred Hill, Defamation and
Privacy Under the FirstAmendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1229 (1976) (citing Popham v.
Pickburn, (1862) 158 Eng. Rep. 730 (Ex.) 733).
97. See, e.g., ODGERS, supra note 38, at 185 ("Fair reports are privileged, while fair

comments, if on matters of public interest, are not libels at all.").
98. See Tabart v. Tipper, (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 981 (K.B.) 983 ("[I]t is not libelous to
ridicule a literary composition, or the author of it, in as far as he has embodied himself with his
work; and that if he is not followed into domestic life for the purposes of personal slander, he
cannot maintain an action for any damage he may suffer in consequence of being thus rendered
ridiculous."). For a brief survey of some of these early English book review cases, see Post,
Constitutional Concept, supra note 22, at 627 and John E. Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TEX. L. REV.

41, 44-45 (1929). Remarkably similar in analysis and effect is the much more recent American
case of Moldea v. NY Times Co., 22 F.3d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1994), where the D.C. Circuit held
commentary in a book review was not actionable: "[W]hen a reviewer offers commentary that is
tied to the work being reviewed, and that is a supportable interpretation of the author's work, that
interpretation does not present a verifiable issue of fact that can be actionable in defamation." Id. at
313.
99. See Douglas R. Robideaux, A Longitudinal Examination ofNegative PoliticalAdvertising
and Advertisement Attitudes: A North American Example, 10 J. MARKETING COMM. 213, 220

(2004) ("The affective response to negative advertisements was negative in the earlier 1992 study
and continued to be, but at a much greater level.").
100. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 606 cmt. a (1938) ("Typical facts which, as
matters of public concern, may be commented upon ... are the public acts and qualifications of
public officers and candidates for office, the management of educational, charitable and religious
institutions, literary, artistic and scientific productions, and the conduct of persons who, by special
appeal or otherwise, have offered their conduct or product to the public for approval." (citations
omitted)).
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courts can step aside and let the "marketplace of ideas"101 resonate and work its
will.
Well into the twentieth century, there was debate in the United Kingdom and
in the United States about whether comments on matters of public concern were
so to be encouraged that-even if false and defamatory-they might be thought
of as the speaker's "right."102 But by the end of the nineteenth century, the
common law in both countries largely saw comments on publicly important
matters to provide a qualified privilege to defendants who could not "justify"
their defamatory utterances by proving their substantial truth.103 The privilege of
"fair comment," which in England has been embodied statutorily, 10 4 was
generally called the privilege of fair comment on matters of public concern.105 A
non-justifying defendant asserting this privilege might prevail (despite the
inability to prove substantial truth) unless the plaintiff defeated the privilege by
showing one form or another of "malice." 106
However, a major issue remained unsettled, one that in a real sense awaited
Sullivan for its ultimate resolution: Did the privilege of fair comment help a
defendant who based his "comment" (or opinion) on a fully stated but ultimately

101. Abrams v. UnitedStates, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For further
discussion of this concept, see infra note 184.
102. See, e.g., S. Hetton Coal Co. v. Ne. News Ass'n, [1894] 1 Q.B. 133 (C.A.) 143 (appeal
taken from Eng.) ("I am clearly of opinion that a matter like this now before the Court may be made
the subject of hostile criticism and of hostile animadversion, provided the language of the writer is
kept within the limits of an honest intention to discharge a public duty."); Dix W. Noel, Defamation
of Public Officers and Candidates,49 COLUM. L. REv. 875, 877 (1949) ("There is controversy as to

whether fair comment is to be regarded as privileged defamation or as entirely outside the scope of
actionable defamation."). Note, however, that the "right-not privilege" approach-now generally
discarded-was a double-edged sword for some defendants, and perhaps particularly those who
could not prove the factual predicates on which they laid their "right" to comment. At this point, for
some authorities, the "right" disappeared altogether! See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 566 cmt. b (1977) ("It was the first, or pure, type of expression of opinion to which the privilege
of fair comment [on matters of public concern] was held to apply. [However, s]ome courts and
commentators took the position that the true explanation of the defense of fair comment was not that
the statement was made on a privileged occasion but that, not being actually a false statement of
fact, it could not be a defamatory communication. [The Restatement (First)of Torts] set out the
principles of the privilege of fair comment in §§ 606-10; it did not espouse this position."). The
"right," in other words, ended exactly where the majority privilege jurisdictions placed it prior to
Sullivan at the first appearance of a factual error. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
271-72 (1964).
103. See Noel, supra note 102, at 877-78. A leading British book review case, after finding
little practical difference between the right and the privilege, opted for the latter. See McQuire v.
W. Morning News Co., [1903] 2 K.B. 100 (Eng.) 112.
104. See Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 6 (Eng.) ("In an action
for libel or slander in respect of words consisting partly of allegations of fact and partly of
expression of opinion, a defen[s]e of fair comment shall not fail by reason only that the truth of
every allegation of fact is not proved if the expression of opinion is fair comment having regard to
such of the facts alleged or referred to in the words complained of as are proved.").
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 566

cmt. a (1977); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF

TORTS § 606 cmt. a (1938).
106. See KEETON ET. AL., supranote 92,
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false factual predicate? Although at least one court held that "harmless" or
"minute" factual errors did not obliterate the privilege, 107 a real split occurredespecially in the United States-as to whether factual falsehoods closely tied to
the defamatory opinion either would receive protection (the "minority rule") or
would utterly destroy the privilege ab initio (the "majority rule"). 108
B.

Sullivan's Second Holding,All but Forgotten in Milkovich
1.

The Old Way: FactualFalsehoodsActionable

If the privilege created by common law had been understood to give safe
harbor to the kinds of utterances litigated in Sullivan, for example, Professor
Epstein would have been correct when he suggested in a famous articlepublished a score of years after that case-that the Warren Court overreached by
not relying on available common law privileges. 109 But in one such area scanted
by Professor Epstein, although absolutely crucial to an eventual understanding of
the First Amendment (and Milkovich's warping of doctrine to narrow its
protections), a majority of American states had-prior to Sullivan-unprotected
factual falsehoods predicating defamatory opinions. 110 Although in England
there was always voice for the idea that the audience should work its way
through to the truth on matters of public importance, as long as the speaker states
or the audience generally knows the full factual record (true or with some
significant errors),"' even in the early book review cases, the privilege

107. See S. Hetton Coal Co. v. Ne. News Ass'n, [1894] 1 Q.B. 133 (C.A.) 143-44 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
108. Noel, supra note 102, at 891 ("A definite majority of courts hold that there is no
conditional privilege, with the result that immunity extends only to comment and opinion; but a
number of jurisdictions have come to the opposite conclusion, and most of the scholars who have
considered the question have followed this minority view." (footnotes omitted) (citing George
Chase, CriticismofPublic Officers and Candidatesfor Office, 23 AM. L. REV. 346, 350-67 (1889);
Hallen, supra note 98, at 61; Jeremiah Smith, Are Charges Against the Moral Characterof a
Candidatefor an Elective Office ConditionallyPrivileged?, 18 MICH. L. REV. 104, 115 (1919))).
109. Epstein, Was Times Wrong?, supra note 22, at 791. Epstein locates two narrow areas in
which the Sullivan Court might have less intrusively reversed the Alabama courts: (1) "the Court
could have constitutionalized the 'of and concerning' requirement," id at 792, or (2) the Court
could have struck down the Alabama verdict on grounds that the state court misapplied the law of
damages because the court awarded $500,000 in general and punitive when the Plaintiff only
demonstrated slight actual damages, id at 793-94. The Supreme Court was mindful of both these
problems above. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 263-65 (1964). However, it
explicitly sought resolution of the more portentous common law question discussed throughout this
Article and especially in this Part. See id. at 267-68. Remarkably enough, in his brief discussion of
relevant common law privileges, Professor Epstein minimizes fair comment, see id. at 785-86, the
privilege most at play in Sullivan, see Sullivan, 376 U.S. at, 292 n.30. For the implications of
Epstein's various forays into Sullivan and its progeny, see infra Part VI.
110. See Noel, supra note 102, at 891. For an authoritative count of "majority" versus
"minority" jurisdictions, see id. at 891-97.
111. For example, British scholar W. Blake Odgers stated the following in his 1905 article:
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disappeared if the defendant departed from a virtually error-free factual basis for
the comment or opinion.1 12 Since this meant that the privilege still required
largely what the separate defense of proving truth had already imposed on
defendants, going beyond a fully accurate factual base and springboarding to a
defamatory comment usually eliminated the defendant's privilege.113 So the
mainstream common law approach to the privilege of fair comment on matters of
public concern eventually did not protect comments based upon false statements
of fact, and it was this so-called American "majority rule" that prevailed in the
courts of Alabama against the Times.114 If Sullivan had not corrected this and
explicitly adopted the "minority rule" of Coleman,115 almost all of the First
Amendment juice-both doctrinal as to matters of public concern, and
aspirational as to zesty debate and knowledgeable audiences-would have been
sapped from the decision. It would not have done anywhere near the same work

Sometimes, however, it is difficult to distinguish an allegation of fact from an expression
of opinion. It often depends on what is stated in the rest of the article. If the defendant
accurately states what some public man has really done, and then asserts that "such
conduct is disgracefiul," this is merely the expression of his opinion, his comment on the
plaintiffs conduct. So, if without setting it out, he identifies the conduct on which he
comments by a clear reference. In either case, the defendant enables his readers to judge
for themselves how far his opinion is well founded; and, therefore, what would otherwise
have been an allegation of fact becomes merely a comment. But if he asserts that the
plaintiff has been guilty of disgraceful conduct, and does not state what that conduct was,
this is an allegation of fact for which there is no defen[s]e but privilege or truth.
ODGERS, supra note 38, at 192-93 (emphasis added). Note, of course, that in Milkovich, as in
Sullivan, the full factual predicate had been set out by the defendant, albeit making some errors. See
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-59. Sullivan
understood that the errors should be part of the evidence weighed by the audience about the
defendant's ultimate judgments, see id. at 270-72; the twenty-year-old case fell off from that idea,
see Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 17-23.
112. For example, in the British book review cases, if a reviewer went outside the book, it
meant trouble. See Merivale v. Carson, [1888] 20 Q.B. 275 at 276-77 (Eng.) (recounting a jury
decision for the plaintiffs in a case where the defendant reviewer's account allegedly included
factual discrepancies).
113. See Defamation Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 6 (Eng.) (suggesting that
the defendant must prove at least the factual basis relevant to the alleged defamation).
114. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 144 So. 2d 25, 37 (Ala. 1962) (citing White v.
Birmingham Post Co., 172 So. 649, 652 (Ala. 1937); Iron Age Pub. Co. v. Crudup, 5 So. 332, 333
(Ala. 1889)). The majority rule in effect replicated for matters of public concern the traditional
necessity for a defendant to "justify"-to prove the substantial truth of the statement. See KEETON
ET. AL., supra note 92, § 111, at 776. It is to this version of the rule-and not Sullivan's correction
of it-that Rehnquist cites in Milkovich. See Milkovich 497 U.S. at 12-15.
115. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). In Coleman, the
defendant newspaper had misstated certain facts about the plaintiff, who was running for public
office. Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 281 (Kan. 1908). Judge Burch paradoxically
foreshadowed Chief Justice Rehnquist by seeing no bright-line distinction between fact and opinion,
id. at 290; however, he concluded-and Sullivan constitutionalized, see Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 27980,-that the absence of such a bright line meant that factual statements eventually seen to be false
should be protected where audiences have the capacity to figure things out themselves, see
Coleman, 98 P. at 291-92.
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if the Court had corrected, on the analysis offered by Professor Epstein, only the
"of and concerning" and "damages" components of the Alabama judgments. 16
The advertisement in Sullivan-famously or infamously, depending on one's
perspective-was replete with factual falsehood. 1 Unable to "justify the
inaccuracies," the Times's lawyers tried out the privilege of fair comment on
matters of public concern. 18 But on the understanding of the common lawfaulty, as we shall see, not only in Alabama but in most American courts as
well-no privilege was available even upon stated (but false) factual premises.119
Thus, in the courts below, the newspaper had no central free speech argument to
make. This had to be corrected, and there was no need to write on a blank slate.
2.

Understanding Sullivan's Common
Statements ofFact Protected

Law: Articulated False

When the Warren Court handed down the Sullivan decision, it had a wealth
of common law defamation knowledge and caselaw at its disposal, and it used
these tools well. 120 The Court did not need to address the troubling issue of
whether one can easily separate facts and opinions for free speech purposes (this
awaited the infamous Gertz dictum and the strange speech-limiting logic of the
dissolution of the dichotomy in Milkovich), for there simply was no getting
around the record below: the newspaper had predicated its critique of Alabama's
law enforcement on several directly relevant factual errors.121 Would the Court
protect this erroneous predicate as much as the comment or opinion on the civil
rights movement that formed the heart of the advertisement? 12 2 The Court's
reasoning made actionable whatever factual errors there may have been in
reporter Diadiun's discussion of Coach Milkovich (whereas the N.Y Times Co.

116. For a discussion of the political implications of Epstein's missing this point in his later
analysis of libel law in Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, see infra Part IV.
117. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 257-59. Such factual falsehoods included the following: the
students sang the National Anthem, not the reported "My Country, 'Tis of Thee"; the school board
expelled nine students for demanding service at a lunch counter, not for the reported leading of the
demonstration; most of the student body, rather than the entire student body as reported, protested
the expulsion by boycotting classes, not by refusing to register for classes; no one ever padlocked
the dining hall as reported; the police arrested Dr. King four times, not the reported seven times; the
police attempted to find those responsible for bombing Dr. King's house, not the reported
suggestion that the police were responsible for bombing the home of Dr. King. Id.
118. See id. at 261-64.
119. See id. at 262 ("The trial judge submitted the case to the jury under instructions that the
statements in the advertisement were 'libelous per se' and were not privileged, so that [the Times]
might be held liable if the jury found that they had published the advertisement and that the
statements were made 'of and concerning' [Sullivan]."); Kalven, supra note 26, at 195 ("The
Alabama law of defamation appears to have been the same as that of the vast majority of American
jurisdictions.").
120. See Kalven, supranote 26, at 212-15.
121. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 257-59 (1964).
122. See id. at 263-64. Note that in Milkovich, the Court explicitly made Diadiun's factual
errors vulnerable to ajury award. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 23 (1990).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol62/iss1/6

22

Weisberg: The First Amendment Degraded: Milkovich v. Lorain and A Continuin

THE FIRST AMENDMENT DEGRADED

2010]

179

v. Sullivan tradition would have shielded those errors on matters of public
knowledge and concern from any libel judgment). Much of the common law
sophistication as to the nature of language and as to the way even seeming
defamation loses its sting in some contexts where knowledgeable audiences can
deflect the power of literal language-a fortuitous melding of First Amendment
and longstanding rules of defamation-has disappeared in the years following
Sullivan, but it was essential to the reasoning and to the holding of that case.
Because the Supreme Court's personnel shifted so radically within ten years of
the decision,123 Gertz paid homage to the great case by limiting that holding to
the famous one everybody knows: a defamation plaintiff who is a public official
must prove that the speaker made an allegedly defamatory utterance either "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not." 124
When Milkovich went out of its way to console the First Amendment
defense bar that it was not tampering with the Sullivan holding,125 it
disingenuously preserved only the first "actual malice" rule while severing the
equally vital protection of factual falsehood in public debates that Sullivan had
constitutionalized.126 Missing altogether, despite the nature of the fact/opinion
question and its utter proximity to the rest of the Sullivan case, was the second
holding in the seminal Warren Court opinion, the one that took up the common
law of Kansas and raised its "minority" rule on matters of public concern to the
status of a First Amendment icon: factual falsehoods as well as comments or
opinions are protected unless the defendant's malice is proven. 12 7
3.

The Integration by Sullivan of the Audience-Trusting Free Speech
Tradition

The key to understanding the pre-Milkovich, fully constitutionalized
minority common law rule returns us, again, to the audience to potentially
defamatory utterances. The common law, first in deciding whether "opinions"
could ever be actionable, concluded negatively if the opinion was "pure"-i.e., if
the speaker based his or her statement on fully disclosed or ascertainable facts,
false or true, or on a fully ascertainable record, such as a book under review or a
matter of general public concern within a given community,128 such as Coach
Milkovich's obsessed Cleveland suburb. 9 It permitted opinions to be

123. Between the Sullivan and Gertz decisions, Justice Warren, Justice Black, Justice Clark,
and Justice Harlan retired, and Justice Goldberg resigned. They were replaced by Justice Burger,
Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Powell. THE UNITED STATES
SUPRE1 E COURT: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 452-53 (Christopher Tomlins ed. 2005).

124. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
125. See Milkovich 497 U.S. at 20 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270).
126. See id.

127. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-83 (1964).
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 ant. b (1977).
129. See Margolick, supra note 27, at B8.
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actionable only if the opinion was based on undisclosed factual predicates.130
These latter "mixed opinion" statements are problematic precisely and solely
because the audience has no knowledge on which to judge the opinion; the
speaker has withheld some or all of the statement's factual predicate.131 Once
the speaker reveals the factual predicates-irrespective of the truth or falsity of
such predicates, the statement is protected. 132 The audience is capable now of
judging the full statement. Nothing has been left out. It was not relevant to
those restating the law of libel, particularly as to matters of public concern,
whether the factual predicate was false or true-the audience would do the
interpretive work: "Criticism of so much of another's activities as are matters of
public concern is privileged if the criticism, although defamatory, (a) is upon, (i)
a true or privileged statement of fact, or (ii) upon facts otherwise known or
available to the recipientas a member of the public."133
Many American courts misunderstood this authoritative essence of the
common law privilege and went on to require factual truth,134 precisely the
requirement already present in the defense of justification (and hence adding
nothing at all to the defendant's arsenal). Sullivan-far from finding fully
revealed, yet false, factual predicates to be harmful or even regrettablereinstated the best wisdom from the common law: audiences do the work and
factual falsehoods move them to even further research and a greater zeal to
correct the present record. 135

130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 566

§ 113A, at 814.

cmt. b (1977); KEETON ET AL., supra note 92,

131. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 92, § 114, at 814. For example, the Restatement (Second)
of Torts offers this actionable hypothetical: "A writes to B about his neighbor C: 'I think he must be
an alcoholic.' A jury might find that this was not just an expression of opinion but that it implied
that A knew undisclosed facts that would justify this opinion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 566 illus. 3 (1977). For a post-Sullivan but pre-Milkovich case following this approach and
allowing further libel action for a statement upon undisclosed facts, see Falls v. Sporting News
PublishingCo., 834 F.2d 611, 614-16 (6th Cir. 1987). This case remains consistent with Sullivan
and the audience policies therein. See id. at 615.
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 566

cmt. b (1977). The Restatement (Second)

of Torts provides the following illustration to demonstrate this proposition:
A writes to B about his neighbor C: "He moved in six months ago. He works
downtown, and I have seen him during that time only twice, in his backyard around 5:30
seated in a deck chair with a portable radio listening to a news broadcast, and with a drink
in his hand. I think he must be an alcoholic." The statement indicates the facts on which
the expression of opinion was based and does not imply others. These facts are not
defamatory and A is not liable for defamation.
Id. at § 566 illus. 4. Note that this example is almost identical to the situation in Milkovich that
produced the climactic statement. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 3-7 (1990).
133. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

§ 606(l)(a)

(1938) (emphasis added). In celebrating

Sullivan, Professor Kalven, who had his ear to the pulse of this great audience-reliant tradition,
stated, "what is really involved is the degree to which the underlying facts are disclosed when the
opinion is expressed and the inference drawn." Kalven, supra note 26, at 195 n.18.
134. See Noel, supra note 102, at 891 ("A definite majority of courts hold that there is no
conditional privilege, with the result that immunity extends only to comment and opinion. . .
135. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19, 279-83 (1964).
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Covertly, Milkovich Opts to Overrule Sullivan's Constitutionalizing
of the Minority Rule on Matters ofPublic Concern

At least since the early nineteenth-century English cases on literary
criticism, there should have been little doubt that the judges reduced the
probability of successful libel suits because they expected informed readers of
book reviews to do the work themselves of testing the reviewer's statements, no
matter how outrageous or even false.136 A relevant example from the fall of
2009 are the "town hall meetings" on healthcare which have produced inflated
and often false rhetoric; 1 37 yet the town hall meeting is a quintessential First
Amendment medium, and no listener on healthcare is presumed not to have the
ability to field even factually erroneous statements on such an expansive and
public matter. 138
However, a majority of American courts gradually came to misunderstand
something about the privilege,139 and Chief Justice Rehnquist-deliberately or
negligently-reasserted the misunderstanding in Milkovich, a misunderstanding
that was by then of constitutional dimension.
The Chief Justice disingenuously said:
"It is worthy of note that at
common law, even the privilege of fair comment did not extend to 'a false
statement of 14
fact,
1 whether it was expressly stated or implied from an expression
of opinion."'

136. See supranotes 41 and 98 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Report: Fox News' Town Hall Coverage Amplifies Opponents ofHealth Care
Reform, Ignores Supporters, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Sep. 8, 2009, 9:00 AM), http://

mediamatters.org/research/200909080004 (discussing the possible media distortion of one outlet
concerning the health care reform town hall meetings).
138. See Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13 (1970) (holding that the
utterance of "blackmail" at a city ordinance meeting, when the speaker knew the statement to be
untrue, was protected speech under the First Amendment). For a further discussion of speech in the
town hall context, see infra Part V.
139. See Noel, supra note 102, at 891.
140. Rehnquist's restatement of prior law is typically double-tongued. See supra notes 24, 57
and accompanying text. The minority rule, constitutionalized by the very precedent he purports to
retain, fails to appear and is violated by the discussion and the holding. For a detailed analysis of a
similar distortion by Rehnquist of a different aspect of libel law in the earlier case of Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976), see Weisberg, supra note 23, at 43-58. He does not choose to rely on
Milkovich being a private figure and hence needing to show less than Sullivan malice; rather, he
fully depends on a "majority" approach to the privilege on matters of public concern, see Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1990), that he knew had been rebuffed forever in that
seminal earlier case. This is somewhat akin to Rehnquist citing lago's infamous statement to
Othello on reputation, id. at 12 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 2, sc. 3), without

revealing something just as obvious: lago is one of Shakespeare's most deviously articulate villains!
See Karl F. Zender, The Humiliation of lago, 34 STUD. ENG. LITERATURE 1500-1900 323, 327

(1994) ("In every dimension of his identity-metaphysical, psychological, social-lago asserts an
absolute separation between language and meaning.").
141. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a
(1977)).
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The statement, at a crucial juncture in the opinion, rhetorically disregards
two crucial aspects of the common law it cites: First, common law judges
utilizing the privilege were divided on whether it also protected factual
falsehoods.142 Second, Sullivan had dipped down into a key strand of that very
common law to protect fully revealed, if ultimately inaccurate, factual predicates
for comments on matters known to the audience.143 The Milkovich opinion
artfully admits the first while negating the latter:
[D]ue to concerns that unduly burdensome defamation laws could stifle
valuable public debate, the privilege of "fair comment" was
incorporated into the common law as an affirmative defense to an action
for defamation. "The principle of 'fair comment' afford[ed] legal
immunity for the honest expression of opinion on matters of legitimate
public interest when based upon a true or privileged statement of fact."
As this statement implies, comment was generally privileged when it
concerned a matter of public concern, was upon true or privileged facts,
represented the actual opinion of the speaker, and was not made solely
for the purpose of causing harm. "According to the majority rule, the
privilege of fair comment applied only to an expression of opinion and
not to a false statement of fact, whether it was expressly stated or
implied from an expression of opinion." Thus under the common law,
the privilege of "fair comment" was the device employed to strike the
appropriate balance between the need for vigorous public discourse and
the need to redress injury to citizens wrought by invidious or
irresponsible speech. 144
A more forthright exposition from the latter passage to the situation before
the Milkovich courts should have thoroughly rehearsed the minority rule that
existed in Rehnquist's formulation only by negative pregnant-by the mention
of the "majority rule" and that rule alone.
But where there is a majority rule,
as we have seen exemplified already as to the fact/opinion conundrum regarding
matters of public concern, there is also a minority rule.146 No decision
preserving Sullivan as a precedent should have overlooked its adoption-as a
matter of constitutional law-of that very minority rule. As put by the Court in
Sullivan, "[W]e consider this case against the backdrop of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,

142. See supranote 108 and accompanying text.
143. See supranotes 114-115 and accompanying text.
144. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 13-14 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 1
FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 456 (1956); RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a (1977)).
145. See id.
146. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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robust, and wide-open .....
and ... must be protected ...

183

[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,
147

Instead, the Chief Justice's conclusions roll back the clock to the preSullivan and Coleman "majority" rule, reinstating what Sullivan had changed so
that, as per the discarded rule: one, the common law privilege of fair comment
does not protect utterances on matters of public concern containing at least one
express false statement of fact;148 two, more generally, opinions lacking such a
false factual predicate may still imply a false statement of fact and hence be
unprotected;
and three, on matters of public concern, one should not presume
that the audience is capable of finding the full factual record and hence
deflecting the defamatory effect of either one or two above.150 These assertions,
nested in an opinion ostensibly safeguarding Sullivan's First Amendment
reasoning,151 negligently or wilfully reinstated the Alabama courts' approach to
freedom of speech when Sullivan first brought his lawsuit.
V. THE "HYPERBOLE CASES" WRONGFULLY DISTINGUISHED
A.

Rehnquist's Neglect of the Audience in the Hyperbole Cases

Perhaps no First Amendment doctrine more explicitly relies on what I have
called the "interpreting audience" than a series of post-Sullivan cases sounding
in hyperbolic or utterly unrealistic utterances accused of being defamatory.
Milkovich wrongfully distinguished these cases from the one at hand and badly
compartmentalized them, hence reducing their value to vital First Amendment
discourse. Although, of course, they did not involve the precise fact/opinion
dichotomy resolved in Milkovich, their logic should have protected reporter
Diadiun's statement on grounds fully related to that dichotomy. So while the
Chief Justice's rhetoric reassures by purportedly safeguarding Sullivan and these
progeny cases, supposedly providing sufficient "breathing space" for "freedoms
of expression,"152 his focus on detecting any possible factual component that can
be proven false cabins, if not eliminates, the hyperbole exemptions. The
majority-as it had with Sullivan itself-thus strips the hyperbole precedents of
much of their meaning.
In Greenbelt PublishingAss 'n v. Bresler,153 the word "blackmail" was used
on the floor of a town hall meeting during a fiery debate on the plaintiff s request
for a zoning variance so he could build commercial property.154 The town

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964).
See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18-19.
See id. at 20.
See id. at 22-23.
See id. at 18-21.
Id. at 19 (quoting Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986)).
398 U.S. 6 (1970).
Id. at 7-8, 13.
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looked like it would give him the variance in exchange for other property he
owned.155 The local newspaper, the Greenbelt News Review, reported on the city
council's meetings, and "[t]wo news articles in consecutive weekly editions of
the paper stated that at the public meetings156some people had characterized
Bresler's negotiating position as 'blackmail."'
Now blackmail, like reporter Diadiun's lying under oath,157 looks like the
primal eldest sin that defendants can commit against defamation plaintiffs: the
(false) accusation of a serious crime.158 But Justice Stewart, unlike his colleague
and future Chief Justice, had faith in the audience. After running through the
(then) boilerplate language about the constitutional usefulness of false statements
of fact, 159 the Court dismissed Bresler's complaint on First Amendment grounds
as follows:
It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who reached the
word "blackmail" in either article would not have understood exactly
what was meant: it was Bresler's public and wholly legal negotiating
proposals that were being criticized. No reader could have thought that
either the speakers at the meetings or the newspaper articles reporting
their words were charging Bresler with the commission of a criminal
offense. On the contrary, even the most careless reader must have
perceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a
vigorous epithet used by those who considered Bresler's negotiating
position extremely unreasonable. 160
Three years later, in a comparable case arising during a labor dispute, Justice
Marshall found that the "ordinarily heated" atmosphere of strikes and unrestl61
protected even more extensive attacks on character.162 Defendants had labeled
plaintiffs "scabs" and then embellished by citing Jack London's scurrilous
definition,163 which involved treachery and worse:
Vigorous exercise of [labor's] right "to persuade other employees to
join" must not be stifled by the threat of liability for the overenthusiastic
use of rhetoric or the innocent mistake of fact. ... [S]tatements of fact
or opinion relevant to a union organizing campaign are protected by § 7

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 7.
Id.
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 4-5.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 571 (1977).
Bresler, 398 U.S. at 9-13.

160. Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).
161. Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 272 (1973) (quoting Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966)).

162. Id. at 277-78.
163. Id. at 267-68.
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[of the NLRA], even if they are defamatory and prove to be
erroneous .... 164
In such a context, the Court found that:
It is similarly impossible to believe that any reader of the
[defendants' newsletter] would have understood the newsletter to be
charging the appellees with committing the criminal offense of
treason ....
[Instead the reader would view this as] a lusty and
imaginative expression of the contempt felt by union members towards
those who refuse[d] to join.165
These cases explicitly give full faith and credit to the audience to do its own
interpretive work and to sort the wheat from the chaff, whether in the domain of
fact or opinion. Although he retains these cases, the Chief Justice's Milkovich
rationale never explains why the audience can "do the work" with rhetorical
hyperbole cases yet cannot engage in the same discerning process with
statements regarding matters of public concern.166 Even the dissenting Justices'
confidence in the audience to interpret public concern utterances on its own is, at
best, mixed. 167
The Milkovich majority also explores and distinguishes a variation on the
hyperbole precedent, Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell.168 In that case,
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the absence of "factual"

164. Id. at 277-78.
165. Austin, 418 U.S. at 285-86 (footnote omitted).
166. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1990).
167. The dissent at least recognizes the close connection between Diadiun's sports column and
the hyperbole cases, see id. at 33-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988)), and then tries to add a new category of expression by calling
Diadiun's utterance "conjecture," see id. at 28. The dissent makes its major point perhaps in
stressing the audience's sensitivity to the context and tone of Diadiun's column:
Diadiun's assumption that Milkovich must have lied at the court hearing is patently
conjecture.... Diadiun not only reveals the facts upon which he is relying but he makes
it clear at which point he runs out of facts and is simply guessing....
Furthermore, the tone and format of the piece notify readers to expect speculation
and personal judgment. The tone is pointed, exaggerated, and heavily laden with
emotional rhetoric and moral outrage.
Id. at 28-32 (footnote omitted). Yet the two-justice dissent is ultimately disappointing, see supra
note 36 and accompanying text, because it accepts fully the majority's process of searching for and
then making actionable anything that might look like a factual falsehood. See Milkovich, 497 U.S.
at 24-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This is, as I have been arguing, not only bad doctrine, but also a
fundamental reversal of Sullivan, which never saw potential or actual error as scary to an informed
listener.
168. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
48-50 (1988) (addressing an ad-parody portraying Falwell sleeping with his mother in an outhouse
with the title, "Jerry Falwell talks about his first time." (internal quotation marks omitted))).
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material in an ad parody prevented the plaintiff from satisfying the Sullivan
malice burden in a suit sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress. 169
That case marked a subtle departure from the mainstream hyperbole doctrine,170
which was less interested in whether there was a realistic-sounding factual
component to the utterance that could be proven false than it was in the
audience's ability to interpret within certain contexts the meaning of both factual
and non-factual statements.17 1 Even given this important and unfortunate move
towards "factual policing" as I call it, the Chief Justice might have better
explained why a reasonable audience could discount Falwell's crude Campari ad
("Jerry Falwell talks about his first time") 172 as parody, 17 3 but could not interpret
for themselves the believability of statements made in Diadiun's article
regarding a matter with which the whole community was conversant.174
Milkovich finds that the statements made in the article were "not the sort of
loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language" that would find constitutional
protection. 175 In order to do this, the majority shifts from an audience-based
analysis to one predicated on Diadiun's intention: the defendant, says the Court,
"seriously maintain[ed]" that Coach Milkovich committed perjury during his
questioning.176 But this analysis as to intention transmogrifies Justice Stewart's
audience-sensitive approach to "blackmail"1 77 or Justice Marshall's similar sense
of "scab"178 into a scary communication ("liar" or even "liar under oath") that
the audience simply cannot field without judicial assistance; Rehnquist's own
reasoning in Falwell-where the question for the courts was whether the

169. Falwell,485 U.S. at 56-57.
170. Interestingly, Falwell at one point hints at the audience-interpreter's powers, but these are
limited to the reader's ability to interpret the advertisement as a parody, not an assertion of fact. Id
at 53-56. The shifting, fact-skeptical, First Amendment conjured by the Court in Falwell begins to
draw a fearful line wherever a court might see an utterance as attempting to convey "facts," see
Brief for the Law & Humanities Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3-4, Falwell,
485 U.S. 46 (No. 86-1278), 1987 WL 881311, instead of trusting the audience to use the context to
parry even realistic and factually false statements. The Law and Humanities Institute's brief, coauthored by the present writer, sought a rule protecting not only wildly unbelievable imaginative
depictions, but also realisticexpressions of the imagination that more likely gave the appearance of
communicating "facts." Id. To this day, realistic films and novels, for example, do not enjoy
constitutional protection, see Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979),
though audiences recognize that the medium of imaginative, however "realistic," is unlikely to harm
clearly identifiable plaintiffs. See Brief for Petitioners at 43-44, Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (No. 861278), 1987 WL 881311.
171. See Falwell,485 U.S. at 52.
172. Id. at 48.
173. See id. at 57.
174. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co, 497 U.S. 1, 3-7 (1990).
175. Id. at 21.
176. See id.
177. See supranotes 158-65 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
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statements made would "reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts" 179
also limits his reasoning in Milkovich. so Although the Falwell formulation
fatally stigmatized factual utterances, it at least had the merit of focusing less on
the intention of the writer than the ability of the audience to interpret the
statements.
In Milkovich, then, there is considerably less deference to the audience than
in the Bresler-Falwell precedents. The majority is flatly uninterested in the
audience's own foreknowledge of the Cleveland-area dispute. Presuming a
defamatory intent, and looking only at the uncontextualized allegation that the
coach is a liar, the Court finds an absence of "loose, figurative, or hyperbolic
language."182 It progresses to the provability of factual-seeming words like
"liar," hence redirecting analysis of statements or misstatements of fact away
from audience cognition towards a "plain meaning" determination of whether a
statement or word can be verifiably false.183 This is inconsistent with all earlier
Supreme Court doctrine-even including the Chief Justice's own contributionwhich welcomed even factual falsehoods to the debate once in the interpretive
hands of a knowledgeable audience.
B. Milkovich's Move Towards "Quality Control" and "FactPolicing"

The constitutional value of a robust, wide-open public debate and its
acceptance of even false statements of fact depends largely on the First
Amendment community's judgments at any given time about both the speaker's
freedom of speech and the audience's ability to listen, to interpret, and to reengage in public debate. 18 4 There is no theoretical difference between an

179. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (alteration in original) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
180. See id.

181. See id. at 21.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 21-22.
184. This theory has its origins in Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919), in which Holmes stated:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment.... [W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death ....
Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Numerous constitutional scholars have supported Holmes's
marketplace of ideas. See generally Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57

DUKE L.J. 821, 829 (2008) ("[T]he 'marketplace of ideas' metaphor,. . . had as major an impact as
any Supreme Court decision on popular and academic thinking about the First Amendment....
Scholars and commentators have generally conceptualized the metaphor as invoking the perfect
competition of an idealized neoclassical free market."); William P. Marshall, In Defense of the
Search for Truth as a FirstAmendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995) ("[T]he search for

truth provides a unifying theory of both the Speech and Religion Clauses and ... remains a viable
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audience that can distinguish rhetorical hyperbole and an audience that
participates in a robust debate on public matters of concern-the audience is the
same. Furthermore, an audience that already has a knowledge base has the
informed ability to judge for itself the merit of each new related utterance. Yet
we have seen Milkovich strip earlier doctrine clean by adopting a patronizing
judicial control over the vast majority of utterances-those that do not indulge in
fantastical or exaggerated speech.
Milkovich makes judgments about the "quality" of contentious speech;185
however, this is inconsistent with Sullivan's notion that the audience, and not the
courts, should make such judgments. 1 86 Under Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
courts have become the "fact-police." They have been instructed to ferret out
potential factual statements and punish them.
As we have seen, Chief Justice Rehnquist's pervasive methodology in
Milkovich is to pigeonhole the Court's leading First Amendment precedents and
to put them in a "lock-box" as though they had little or nothing to do with the
free speech issues central to the case at hand.187 Thus, Sullivan is relegated
virtually to its narrow (if admittedly key) "actual malice" rule, while bottled and
corked are all its common law juices about the audience and its ability to field
factual falsehoods as well as defamatory opinions.
Similarly, and in some
ways more surprisingly still, Milkovich diminishes the leading cases on
hyperbole and intrinsically non-factual utterances, 189 and their obvious audiencerelated lessons for the instant case go unexplored or are ground down.

First Amendment justification."); Frederick Schauer, Towards an InstitutionalFirstAmendment, 89

MINN. L. REv. 1256, (2005) ("[A] large number of the widely accepted justifications for freedom of
speech are about the social and not individual value of granting to individuals an instrumental right
to freedom of speech." (footnote omitted)). For my discussion on why protecting false statements
of fact enhances both the citizen and the community, see infra Part VLA.
185. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 22 ("[N]umerous decisions ... surely demonstrate the Court's
recognition of the [First] Amendment's vital guarantee of free and uninhibited discussion of public
issues. But there is also another side to the equation; we have regularly acknowledged the
'important social values which underlie the law of defamation,' and recognized that '[s]ociety has a
pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation." (second
alteration in original) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966))). For a discussion of
Professor Epstien's adoption of this fallacy, see infra Part VII.
186. See supranotes 88-90 and accompanying text.
187. See supra Part IV.B.4 and accompanying text.
188. See supra Part IV.B.4 and accompanying text.
189. See supra Part V.A and accompanying text.
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VI. THE CITIZEN VALUE BEHIND THE INTERPRETING AUDIENCE APPROACH: AN
ANSWER TO POST AND EPSTEIN

A.

Why ProjectingFalse Statements into the Public Discourse Enhances
Both Citizen and Community
1. A Tradition ofSpeech as "Venting"

The struggle at common law and within free speech (and First Amendment)

theory and doctrine to preserve a valued place for factual falsehood goes back to
Milton and Mill:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the
earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and
prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple;
who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter? 90
Of course twentieth-century history has put us on our guard about truth's
capacity to withstand and defeat factual falsehood, or indeed other kinds of
verbal falsity.191 The liberal speech orthodoxies are challenged by models of a
kinder and gentler discursive universe in which falsehoods are punished and
everyone just feels a lot better.192 Nonetheless, it is of the utmost importance, in
my view, both to resist incursions on the traditional welcoming of the statements

we abhor and to be very skeptical that communal hatred arises largely through
hateful words as opposed to negative values that are inculcated in people early in
their lives and need little verbal prodding thereafter.

Some prejudicial

inculcation is ethnic and religious, and if one were to hope for improvement
through regulating linguistic falsehoods, one would have to start with texts that
are too "sacred" to censor. But the main point remains that it is better to deal
with hateful speech (and certainly with the more venial categories of speech that

190. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 58 (AMS Press Inc. 1971) (1644); see also JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 20 (Albert Anderson & Lieselotte Anderson eds., Agora Publ'ns, Inc. 2003)
(1859) ("We can never be sure that the opinion we are trying to stifle is a false opinion; and even if
we were sure, stifling it would still be an evil.") Although Mill (unlike Milton) speaks pervasively
of opinions, it is clear that factual falsehoods are embedded in the generalized liberal argument:
"Very few facts are able to tell their own story without comments to bring out their meaning." Id. at
24. As though reflecting the then developing common law of fair comment on matters of public
concern, see supra notes 37-40 and Part IV, Mill sees the reciprocity between a factual predicate
(true or false) and the "story" derived from that base in the form of an opinion (right or wrong).
191. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 19-29
(1982), as reprinted in JOHN H. GARVEY & FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A

READER 66 (2d ed. 1996) ("The survival theory of truth is alluringly uncomplicated; but as the basis
for the principle of free speech it suffers from crippling weaknesses.").
192. See, e.g., id. at 28 ("[U]npleasant side effects may accompany the expression of erroneous
views ....

[P]eople may be offended, violence or disorder may ensue, or reputations may be

damaged.").
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we have seen in these cases) than to suppress it and let wrong ideas simmer until
they reach physically violent dimensions.193
The notion that "bad" speech should generally be uncensored and that
audiences normatively discount the effect of speech in figuring things out is part
of our founding heritage. Thomas Jefferson spoke of criticism of government
through freedom of the press as an efficient way to effectuate reform: "This
formidable [verbal] censor of the public functionaries, by arraigning them at the
tribunal of public opinion, produces reform peaceably, which must otherwise be
done by revolution." 9 4
2.

Speech as a "Cloudy Medium"

Furthermore, our Framers had a precise view of the effect of language on
audiences and articulated that view early on. In Federalist No. 37, Madison
discusses the difficulty of communicating facts and opinions regarding the
proposed Constitution even to audiences rationally disposed to hear them. 195
The problem, however, lay not with the audiences but with the confusing nature
of the language itself:
Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects and the
imperfection of the human faculties, the medium through which the
conceptions of men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh
embarrassment.

The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity,

therefore, requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly formed,
but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively
appropriate to them. But no language is so copious as to supply words
and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many
equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it must happen that
however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and

193. As a scholar both of the Holocaust and of the First Amendment, I am convinced that
Hitler and his allies in various European countries came to power because of ingrained attitudes
inflamed by economic crisis or professional weakness and not by the latest speech acts of bad men,
no matter how pernicious.

See RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN

FRANCE 265 (1996). Attempts to paper over longstanding underlying attitudes of racial or ethnic
hatred by piecemeal regulation of hateful speech acts, see RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC,

MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? 10-11 (1997) (arguing that lack of societal reinforcement for racist
behavior will eventually change the attitudes underlying that behavior and citing "a tort for racial
slurs [as] a promising vehicle for the eradication of racism"), are badly misguided, in my opinion.
194. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A. Coray (Oct. 31, 1823), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF

THOMAS JEFFERSON 480, 483 (1904). Such sentiments may explain Jefferson's antipathy to
anything like Seditious Libel statutes, see GARRY WILLS, A NECESSARY EvIL 134-36 (1999), and
imply that he likely would have admired the Sullivan opinion. Thomas Emerson later restated
Jefferson's view and cited the cheapness of speech as the reason to liberate it: "[E]xpression is
normally conceived as doing less injury to other social goals than action." Thomas I. Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 881 (1963).

195. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 225, 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition
of them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in
which it is delivered. And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater
or less, according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined.
When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their
own language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and
doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated. 196
Audiences would figure things out, but on far less than perfect information.
This theory, which prefigures similar modem and postmodem approaches to
language that this Article can do no more than reference, holds speech out both
as cheap in some sense and indeterminate in all senses.197
Judges, on these views of language, should fear not one whit a citizenaudience's response to defamatory speech acts. Such a fear, everywhere
identifiable from Gertz through Milkovich, assumes both that somehow language
can be clarified and placed into boxes to make it more or less palatable, and that
audiences are incapable of determining meanings appropriate to a speech-act
context without assistance from judges and even from constitutional law. 198
Instead, courts should trust the citizen conjured in the first four footnotes to
this Article to reach "the final verdict" on the accuracy and the expediency of a
statement. In 2010, we do not need constitutional doctrine that drives people
into a passive sense that they cannot do as well as experts or judges in clarifying,
through contextual interpretation, the inevitably "cloudy medium" of language.
VII.PROFESSORS POST AND EPSTEIN: FEARFUL OF SPEECH, SKEPTICAL OF THE
"INTERPRETING AUDIENCE"

Some superb constitutional thinkers have lost their way, in my view, on the
basic inspirational elements of Sullivan and its progeny either by accepting those
"false prophets"-Gertz and Milkovich-or by retreating to ancillary areas of

196. Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
197. See, e.g., Jeremy Cohen et al., PerceivedImpact ofDefamation: An Experiment on Third-

Person Effects, 52 PUB. OPINION Q. 161, 165-166 (1988) (discussing an empirical study of the
effects of libel); Sowle, supra note 11, at 584-586 (commenting on theories about whether "point of
view" opinions should be actionable); Jeffery E. Thomas, A PragmaticApproach to Meaning in
Defamation Law, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 333, 337-339 (1999) (describing various theories "that
focus[] on the way language is used"). See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY,

28-29 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976) (discussing the study of grammatology and
linguistics); DENIS MCQUAIL, AUDIENCE ANALYSIS (1997) (discussing the multiple aspects of
audience analysis and research).
198. See generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as First

Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 799, 850 (2010) ("If we the people are incapable of
rationally choosing our collective fates, then democracy is doomed to failure. On a more practical
level, the failure to apply a rational audience assumption would inevitably lead to a dumbing down
of public discourse, making speakers responsible if they failed to predict the interpretation placed
on their speech by less sophisticated audience members.").
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common law doctrine while slighting those areas this Article (through Sullivan)
has emphasized. 199 Throughout this Article I have argued against their positions
on the doctrinal level, piece by piece. But more globally, I believe their
positions construct a citizen-audience incapable of figuring things out on its
own.
For Professor Epstein, the constructed citizen-audience is a passive receiver
of information needing firmer rules (mostly plaintiff-favorable) to find its way to
truth or falsehood:
Indeed it is not surprising that the plaintiffs level of frustration is so
great in defamation cases precisely because of the frequency with which
the defendant avoids the only issue that matters to the plaintifffalsehood, which could allow rehabilitation of the plaintiffs reputation.
The public, too, is a loser because the present system places systematic
roadblocks against the correction of error.200
In fact, the citizen-listener disappears from Epstein's analysis after a very
quick and dismissive mention of "a third party" to the defamatory utterance
itself.201

He does allow, as to group libel, that the "audience will know or at

least intuit" the falsity of a statement made about a class of persons.202
Inexplicably, this faith in the informed listener (or just maybe the intuitively
sound listener) does not carry over to the mainline tradition of cases we have
been discussing.
So it falls to a strongly enforced set of legal rules to assure a higher quality
of speech-"the best kind of public debate" 203 -or so the rulemakers have
decided. But instead, we might better rely less on quality than on quantity
(particularly in an Internet age) and trust the citizen-listener to know, learn
more, correct, and decide.
Professor Post's citizen-listener is different from Professor Epstein's, but his
skepticism towards the audience-trusting Sullivan model is just as palpable.
Sullivan's and Coleman's identification of factual falsehood as a key element in
discussing matters of public concern troubles Post greatly, and he gives the
tradition short shrift.204 Defamatory falsehoods, for Post, can destroy individuals
and communities, which are often incapable of self protection and hence need

199. For my discussion on the common law doctrine, see supra Part IV.A.2.
200. Epstein, Was Times Wrong?, supra note 23 at 814 (footnote omitted).
201. Id. at 785.
202. Id. at 793.
203. Id. at 799; see supra Part V.B.
204. See supra note 57. Professor Post also wonders if courts have a good grasp on how to
identify matters of public concern at all, reflecting a misplaced skepticism that began in the
disastrous Gertz case. See Post, ConstitutionalConcept, supra note 22, at 679. But there is little
evidence that judges across the centuries have had real difficulty spotting what counts as public
discourse as opposed to what is merely trash talk, gossip, or some other form of merely privatized
verbiage.
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the occasional help of legislators and courts.205 This top-down punishing of
discourse deemed to be threatening is served by Professor Post's support for the
"majority rule" on the privilege of fair comment on matters of public concern,
which in that form "subordinated [public] discourse to community notions of
propriety and decency." 206 There is no room for factual falsehood in this vision,
and there is a consequential downplaying of the role of the interpreting citizen,
similar to the diminution we have seen in Gertz,20720and then in Milkovich.208
Post wants a kinder, gentler world of words. 209 He seems to want to make
speech "better," but, unlike Epstein, his polestar is less about restoring the
individual plaintiffs reputation by punishing falsity than it is about instilling
"community norms" of "constructive public debate." 210 To this extent, he is a
worthy representative of those who balance speech with notions of community,
equality, and especially dignity. 211 Those noble abstractions vie with the
individual's unlimited right to speak aggressively and sometimes falsely, which
creates a First Amendment "paradox," at least for Professor Post:
The real problem with contemporary doctrine is ... that it fails to
articulate with sufficient clarity what is actually at stake in the definition
of public discourse. We need to establish a domain of public discourse
that is amply sufficient to the needs of democratic self-governance, but
that is also reasonably sensitive to competing value commitments, to the
pre-existing social norms that define the genre of public speech, and to
the social consequences implied by the paradox of public discourse....
The [F]irst [A]mendment preserves the independence of public
discourse so that a democratic will within a culturally heterogeneous
state can emerge under conditions of neutrality, and so that individuals
can use the medium of public discourse to persuade others to experiment
in new forms of community life. The ultimate dependence of public

205. See Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 22, at 684-86. Post interestingly, and
predictably, supports the group libel decision in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)
(upholding an Illinois statute that made it unlawful to publish an unflattering depiction of a class of
citizens). See Post, ConstitutionalConcept, supra note 22, at 680.
206. Id. at 629.
207. See supra PartIII.
208. See supra Part IV.B.
209. See Post, ConstitutionalConcept, supra note 22, at 604-05.
210. Id.
211. For example, Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights implies that a
certain dignity must attach to the freedom of expression. See Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. I have tried to
suggest earlier in this Section that dignity, especially as conceived after World War II, will not be
reconstructed through regulation of speech, no matter how bad, false, or hateful. Dignity will arise
through rehabilitation of underlying attitudes learned early, often from texts (some Biblical in
proportion) that will never be censored.
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discourse upon community life, however, suggests that this neutrality
and freedom is always limited, for the very boundaries of public
discourse must be located in a manner that is sensitive to ensuring the
continued viability of the community norms that inculcate the ideal of
rational deliberation.2 12
The paradigmatically reformist voice found in this passage constructs an
ideal of "community" while deflating at the same time a confident picture of the
individuals within the community. The citizen-audience cannot have a debate
inclusive of factual falsehoods because these may disrupt the values of tolerance
and dignity.2 13 My redirection from the individual speaker to the audience,
however, reinserts precisely the notion of "community" that I believe resolves
Post's paradox. Sullivan's and Coleman's community is not one of relatively
passive speech-consumers, but one of thoughtful, interpreting speech activists.
This community, debating as a community, easily parries the kinds of false
speech especially feared by Post (his specific referent is the distasteful ad parody
in Falwell).214 If mainstream readers, particularly grouped together as an
audience, cannot contextualize falsehoods generated by overheated, opinionated
speech, then most challenging speech acts, including all varieties of imaginative
expression, will be seen as intolerable threats.215 More generally, Professor
Post's "paradox" disappears once Sullivan's audience-trusting First Amendment
values are reinvigorated. Faith in the audience to absorb and weigh public
speech is entirely consistent with "community," and not at loggerheads with it.
VIII.

CONCLUSION AND PARTING GLIMPSES AT CURTIS PUBLISHING AND

CITIZENS UNITED

The combination of Sullivan and the common law it drew on so accurately
and inspirationally suffices decades later to help construct and motivate an alert
and acquisitive citizen; one who-using any and all technologies and even those
unforeseeable to judges of an earlier era-aggressively seeks information,
interprets it, and is not easily distracted by exaggeration of opinion or falsity of
fact. Together with a community of such listeners and readers, this citizen
reaches out to gain new information and to add its voice to the mix of facts and
opinions about matters of public concern. Impatient, too, with the early and
overhasty move to impose Sullivan's malice test on "public figures," hence
liberating speech about celebrities as though this were as important as speech
about public officials (and public matters generally),216 this citizen-community

212. Post, ConstitutionalConcept, supra note 22, at 683-84.

213. See id. at 604-05.
214. See id. at 605-626.
215. For a discussion of realistic fiction, see supra note 170 and accompanying text.
216. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967).
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will gradually redirect its interpretive energies to the business of being a selfgovernor, and not a passive and helpless recipient of information.
Such a norm, present at some times and absent at others, aspires to a First
Amendment jurisprudence protective not only of speakers and their targets, but
also of citizens whose duty it is to interpret public speech, a key responsibility of
the self-governed. On this view, a legitimate opposition to the explosive
outcome in Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission217 might well resist
protecting corporations as speakers. Once the Court foregrounds the audience,
as throughout this Article, however, such fears are offset-the audienceinterpreter should easily parry even the most massive influx of corporate
propaganda.
IX. AN EPILOGUE ON SNYDER V. PHELPS
As this Article goes to press, the Supreme Court is considering the most
recent case to appraise the meaning of Milkovich, the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Snyder v. Phelps.218 Relying heavily on the twenty-year-old precedent,219 the
appeals court reversed a multi-million dollar judgment in favor of a bereaved
family that, while trying quietly to bury a son who had died in the Iraq War, had
been berated by abusive language from a group of anti-gay zealots. 220 Disturbed
by the country's willingness to allow gays to serve in the military, the defendants
protested at the funeral and then used their website to continue their assault on
the family and further publicize their message.221 Even though Snyder, the war
222
hero, was not gay, he was associated in death with such ideas as "God Hates
the USA," "Fag troops," "Thank God for dead soldiers," 223 and perhaps of
special significance, "Albert Snyder and his ex-wife 'taught Matthew to defy his
224
creator,' 'raised him for the devil,' and 'taught him that God was a liar."'
Although the district court granted summary judgment on the family's
defamation claim, various claims-most notably that of intentional infliction of
emotional distress-survived, 225 prevailed, 226 and were then overturned by the
Fourth Circuit. 227
As I have written elsewhere, the Fourth Circuit's heavy reliance on
Milkovich to do the work of upholding defendants' First Amendment rights in an

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010).
See id. at 218-20.
See id. at 210-12.
See id. at 212 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571-72 (D. Md. 2008)).
Joan Biskupic, Protest at Military FuneralIgnites a Test of Free Speech, USA TODAY,

Aug. 30, 2010, at

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

lA.

Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 572 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at215-16.
Id. at 226.
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emotional distress case is doubly suspect.228 First, Milkovich stands as one of the
major plaintiff-favorable First Amendment cases of the past quarter-century; 229 it
is odd to see such a speech-limiting precedent being used as the primary means
for reversing a pro-plaintiff verdict.
Second, as a libel case, Milkovich does
not seem to provide much of a precedent for an analysis of Snyder's surviving
successful claims231-and, most notably, the family's successful claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The main lines of the Fourth Circuit's jurisprudential approach in Snyder are
supported by the pre-Milkovich tradition rehearsed throughout the present
Article 232 and, therefore, are largely contradicted by the twenty-year-old
Rehnquist decision, which I have argued here is an outlier to that great
tradition.2 33 But the two pre-Milkovich decisions cited importantly by the Fourth
Circuit234 are inapposite to Snyder because they both involved a public figure
plaintiff.235 Most significantly, the Milkovich approach to detecting whether a
statement is sufficiently "factual" to be actionable cannot fairly be used against
the Snyder plaintiffs.
Relying as well on its own precedents in Bioypherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc.236
and CACI PremierTechnology, Inc. v. Rhodes,23 which are (again) defamation

cases,238 the Fourth Circuit opines:

228. Richard Weisberg, Two Wrongs Almost Make a "Right": The 4th Circuit'sBizarre Use
of the Already Bizarre "Milkovich" Case in Snyder v. Phelps, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO
345, 348 [hereinafter Weisberg, Two Wrongs].
229. See id.
230. See id. at 348 n.23.
231. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 3 (1990).
232. Compare Snyder, 580 F.3d at 226 ("Notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature
of the words being challenged in these proceedings, we are constrained to conclude that the
Defendants' signs and ... [web site] are constitutionally protected."), with Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) ("[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a
sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that
consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection." (alteration in original) (quoting
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
233. See supra Part IV.B.4.
234. In Snyder, the Fourth Circuit cites both to Milkovich and to Falwell for the proposition
"That there are constitutional limits on the type of speech to which state tort liability may attach."
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 218 (citing Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16; Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50). The court also
cites to the statement at issue in Greenbelt Cooperative PublishingAss'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 1314 (1970), in its discussion of "rhetorical statements employing 'loose, figurative, or hyperbolic
lanaguage."' Snyder, 580 F.3d at 220 (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21).
235. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 57 n.5 (noting that Falwell, "the host of a nationally syndicated
television show," is undisputedly a public figure); Bresler, 398 U.S. at 8 ("Bresler's counsel
conceded ... that Bresler was a public figure in the community.").
236. See Snyder, 580 F.3d at 219 (citing Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 151 F.3d 180, 184
(4th Cir. 1998)).
237. Id. at 220 (quoting CACI Premier Tech., Inc. v. Rhodes, 536 F.3d 280, 301 (4th Cir.
2008)).
238. See CACI, 536 F.3d at 283; Biospherics, Inc., 151 F.3d at 182.
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[Milkovich found] that the "dispositive question" was "whether a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements in the
[newspaper] column impl[ied] an assertion that [the coach] perjured
himself in a judicial proceeding."
Concluding that the colunm's
assertions were "susceptible of being proved true or false," the Court
determined that they were not protected by the First Amendment.
In light of Milkovich, and as carefully explained by Judge Motz in
our Biospherics decision, we are obliged to assess how an objective,
reasonable reader would understand a challenged statement by focusing
on the plain language of the statement and the context and general tenor
of its message.

...

[R]hetorical

statements

employing

"loose,

figurative,

or

hyperbolic language" are entitled to First Amendment protection ... .239
There are three problems with this key passage, even before we emphasize that
Milkovich and the Fourth Circuit's own cited precedents lie in defamation and
not in intentional infliction of emotional distress. First, Milkovich announces to
lower courts the task of scrutinizing statements thoroughly, not at all to protect
them, but rather to find wherever possible some actionable, factual component
within them.240 Second, Milkovich did find-questionably, as I have argued in
this Article-that statements in that case not dissimilar to ones in Snyder indeed
contained elements susceptible of a true/false test and were not rhetorical
hyperbole. 24 1 Third, perhaps mindful of these anomalies, the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning shifts uneasily to Supreme Court precedents more directly on point
than Milkovich,242 all of which have been discussed in this Article, as well as its
own CACI precedent, where "CACI claimed that it had been defamed by a talk
radio host. ..."243 The Fourth Circuit held that the host's statements "could not
reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about CACI .... [T]he host had
simply used 'loose and hyperbolic terms' to press her case against the
government's use of military contractors." 244
If Milkovich were fairly applied to Phelps's statements, several components
of the extreme group's statements would have been found "factual"-meaning
open to a true/false proof test. Had the case lay in defamation instead of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the judgment below would have been

239. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 219-20 (second & fourth alterations in original) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1990)).
240. See supranotes 85-87 and accompanying text.
241. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21. For a summary of the facts of Milkovich, see supra Part
II.
242. See Snyder, 580 F.3d at 217-21.
243. Id. at 22 0.
244. Id. at 221 (quoting CACI, 536 F.3d at 302).
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affirmed. The word "liar"-common to both cases-provides one example:
Milkovich found the reporter's use of the word "liar" unprotected, even in the
overheated atmoshere of the community's debate about the fracas at the
wrestling match.
Analogously, the lower court here would have been more
than justified in affirming, under the First Amendment, a jury verdict against the
speaker of the following statements: "Albert Snyder and his ex-wife 'taught
Matthew to defy
his creator,' 'raised him for the devil,' and 'taught him that God
246
was a liar."'
On Milkovich's reasoning, these statements at least can be proven or
disproven, and it is interesting that the word "liar" links the cases in a proplaintiff manner awkwardly avoided by the Fourth Circuit. Exactly how did the
Snyders bring up their son? Is this not precisely analogous to the question of
whether Coach Milkovich lied under oath?
As this Article has centrally argued,247 and as the Fourth Circuit recognizes
in citing its own precedents that were so reliant on the pre-Milkovich speechenhancing progeny that flowed from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Justice
Rehnquist wanted courts to probe and find, wherever possible, the lurking
factual falsehood his Court (and not the great precedents) so feared.248 Milkovich
is simply not the peg on which to hang a defendant-favorable verdict based on a
supposed absence of factual material!249 Again, the Milkovich Chief Justice's
primary instruction to the lower courts as to whether a statement contained a
provable factual element was "Seek and ye shall find!" And thus the Fourth
Circuit, if it was faithfully adhering to the precedent it cites so centrally, should
have and would have found factually-fraught statements within Phelps's
extended communications about Snyder.
Furthermore, courts cannot convincingly use Milkovich as precedent in the
actual arena of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which must instead
hearken to Falwell.250 Having certified that question,251 it is likely the Supreme
Court will focus on whether a private family so calumniated should be bound by
a defendant-favorable precedent against Jerry Falwell, one of the most visible
public figures of his generation.252

245. See supra PartII.
246. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 212 (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md.

2008)).
247. See supra Part I.B.

248. See supranotes 72-73.
249. See supranotes 85-87 and accompanying text.
250. For a full discussion of Falwell, see supra notes 175-88 and accompanying text.
251. The Court certified the question on March 8, 2010. See Snyder v. Phelps, 130 S. Ct.
1737 (2010). The Snyder's petition presented the following question: "Does Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell apply to a private person versus another private person concerning a private matter?"
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (argued Oct. 6, 2010).
252. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988); supra notes 168-80 and
accompanying text.
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But should the court have sustained the Snyders' award on normative First
Amendment grounds? As I have stated elsewhere, the Fourth Circuit's "little
wrong" in misinterpreting Milkovich endeavors to do the "great right" 253 of
redeeming the audience-trusting traditions of Sullivan and its pre-Milkovich
progeny. Were this a libel case, I would have no hesitation in applauding the
Fourth Circuit's attempt, in essence, to redeem Rosenbloom v. Metromedia from
Gertz's axing, 254 and to hold for all purposes that once a matter of public concern
is involved (here, gays in the military, religious belief, etc.), Sullivan's difficult
burden is imposed even on private figure plaintiffs, and that the most that might
be pleaded about Phelps's utterances is that they were negligently uttered or
stood as Bresler-type hyperbole, 255 despite their detectable factual nature. Like
the trial court, I would dismiss the defamation claim altogether.2 56
On the other hand, here we have the sustained and outrageous bullying of a
private family wishing nothing but its privacy and a period of grieving for its
son. 257 In my view, the First Amendment under the appropriate precedents, and
also normatively, does not protect such speech from an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim.
The verdict should have been sustained on appeal. If the Supreme Court so
finds, no harm will have been done to the majestic speech-inspiring traditions
that are at the heart of this Article and that Milkovich so betrayed. For the
twenty-year-old case failed to continue the insistence of Sullivan and its progeny
that the audience can sort the wheat from the chaff where factual falsehoods
invade debate on matters of public concern. But in Snyder the primary, private,
and direct audience was Snyder and his family, which unlike Jerry Falwell,
stands entitled to nurse its now exacerbated, private wounds in court.

253. Weisberg, Two Wrongs, supra note 228, at 346 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE
MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1).

254. Id. at 281. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), had too short of a life.
Another disastrous move made in Gertz was to overrule the Rosenbloom plurality opinion holding
even private figure plaintiffs to the Sullivan burden where the utterance was on a matter of public
concern. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
255. See supraPart V.
256. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573 (D. Md. 2008) ("Defendants' motions for
summary judgment were granted as to the defamation claim.").

257. See id. at 571-72.
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